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PUNITIVE COMPENSATION
Cortney E. Lollar*
Criminal restitution is a core component of punishment. In its current form, this
remedy rarely serves restitution's traditional aim of disgorging a defendant's ill-gotten
gains. Instead, courts use this monetary award not only to compensate crime victims for
intangible losses, but also to punish the defendant for the moral blameworthiness of her
criminal action. Because the remedy does not fit into the definition of what most consider
"restitution, " this Article advocates for the adoption of a new, additional designation for
this prototypically punitive remedy: punitive compensation. Unlike with restitution, courts
measure punitive compensation by a victim's losses, not a defendant's unlawful gains.
Punitive compensation acknowledges the critical element of moral blameworthiness pre-
sent in the current remedy. Given this component of moral blameworthiness, this Article
concludes the jury should determine how much compensation to impose on a particular
criminal defendant. The jury is the preferable fact-finder both because jurors represent
the conscience of the community, and because the Sixth Amendment jury trial right com-
pels this result. Nevertheless, many scholars and legislators remain reluctant to permit
juries to determine the financial award in a particular criminal case. Courts and lawmak-
ers share a common misperception that juries make arbitrary, erratic, and irrational de-
cisions, especially in the context ofdeciding criminal punishments and punitive damages,
both of which overlap conceptually with punitive compensation. In debunking this narra-
tive, this Article relies on empirical studies comparing judge and jury decision-making
and concludes that juries are the more fitting fact-finder to determine the amount ofpuni-
tive compensation to impose in a given case. Although anchoring biases, difficulties in
predicting the duration and degree of a crime victim's future emotional response, and
poorly written jury instructions challenge juries, each of these impediments can be coun-
teracted through thoughtful and conscientious systemic responses.
* Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. Thanks to Albertina Antognini, Joshua
Barnette, William Berry, Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Samantha Buckingham, Nina Chernoff, James Donovan, Joshua
Douglas, Andrew Ferguson, Brian Frye, Nicole Huberfeld, Vida Johnson, Wayne Logan, Donald J. Lollar, Janet
Moore, Yolanda Vazquez, Sarah Welling, and Andrew K. Woods for their insightful thoughts on early drafts.
My gratitude to Andrew Kull and Andrew Ferguson for pushing me to create a new term for "criminal restitu-
tion," Robert Kuehn for the initial idea for this Article, Travers Manley for thorough and broad-ranging research
assistance and Franklin Runge for his help in tracking down sources. This Article was the beneficiary of numer-
ous helpful ideas at the Developing Ideas Conference at the University of Kentucky College of Law, the Univer-
sity of Cincinnati and University of Kentucky Colleges of Law Joint Junior Faculty Workshop, and Scholarship
Panel at the PDS in the Legal Academy Symposium.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal courts impose "restitution" as punishment. Both the manner in which
courts impose criminal "restitution" and the implications of failing to pay it illustrate the
remedy's increasingly punitive character.' Unlike restitution proper, what is called "resti-
tution" in criminal proceedings usually is compensation to victims, not the disgorgement
of unlawful gains or unjust enrichment. In fact, criminal "restitution" rarely involves dis-
gorgement or even tangible gain to the defendant; it often contemplates only compensation
for victim losses. Through "restitution," courts order criminal defendants to compensate a
victim's tangible and intangible, current and future losses, without any clear instruction as
to how to calculate those losses. The broadly conceived "restitution" in the criminal con-
text now requires criminal defendants to make monetary amends to crime victims by pay-
ing for any losses those victims attribute to the commission of the crime. Rather than pre-
venting defendants from obtaining an unjust enrichment, criminal "restitution" primarily
aims to make the victim "whole."
The consequences of failing to pay criminal "restitution" mirror those of other
criminal punishments. Once a court imposes "restitution" as part of a criminal sentence, a
defendant's failure to pay it results in the same collateral consequences that attach to other
criminal sentences, including continued disenfranchisement, preclusion from running for
office, disqualification from jury service, suspension of one's driver's license, and even
further incarceration. In fact, criminal defendants often end up incarcerated for a longer
period of time due to a failure to pay a restitution obligation than for their original sen-
tence.2 Although criminal "restitution" certainly has restorative aims, increasingly, the pu-
nitive nature of the remedy eclipses those equitable purposes.
Consequently, the term "restitution" no longer fits the remedy regularly being
imposed in criminal cases; it is a misnomer. This Article advocates recognizing the dis-
tinction between restitution and this markedly different remedy by dividing what is cur-
rently termed criminal "restitution" into two distinct remedies: (1) restitution, a remedy
whose aim remains restorative, and (2) "punitive compensation," a separate remedy with
dual aims of compensating the victim and punishing the defendant. Restitution remains a
primarily civil remedy that corrects an unjust enrichment by requiring the disgorgement
of a defendant's unlawful gains, whereas the newly minted "punitive compensation" co-
vers the majority of "restitution" awards judges currently issue in criminal cases. Unlike
restitution, "punitive compensation" acknowledges the moral blameworthiness at the core
of the regularly utilized criminal remedy. "Punitive compensation" recognizes that courts
impose this remedy largely in an attempt to address the moral harm caused by a criminal
defendant's action, while also compensating a victim's intangible losses.
In identifying this distinct remedy as punitive compensation, this Article acknowl-
edges that the remedy is, in fact, a punishment, thereby raising the question of the appro-
priate fact-finder to determine a punitive compensation amount. This Article concludes
that juries should determine the appropriate amount of punitive compensation a defendant
must pay.
1. See Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93 (2014).
2. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 291 (2014).
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As an initial matter, the Constitution compels this result. The Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 3 In Southern Union Co. v.
United States, one of the most recent cases to elucidate the contours of the jury trial right,
the Court found Sixth Amendment protections applicable to criminal fines.4 As such, any
fact that increases the maximum amount of a criminal fine must be proven to ajury beyond
a reasonable doubt. Applying the same logic results in the undeniable conclusion that the
Sixth Amendment also should apply to punitive compensation, a monetary penalty paid to
victims instead of the government. Although practitioners and scholars have reached this
conclusion, the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue. 5
Not only does the Constitution compel this result, jurors, as community representa-
tives, are in the best position to determine the proper monetary sanction for a violation of
our community mores. The focus of criminal trials and guilty pleas is legal and moral guilt;
the focus of criminal sentencing hearings is the appropriate manner and degree of express-
ing condemnation of a person who has engaged in behavior that we, as a society, deem to
be morally wrong. When we consider the punitive element present in punitive compensa-
tion decisions, the jury's role as moral compass becomes compelling.
Despite the undeniable rationale for allowing juries to determine punitive compen-
sation, many have questioned whether submitting this decision to a jury is a good idea.
They share a common perception that jurors are prone to arbitrary and excessive judgments
in both civil damage and criminal felony decisions. Many lawyers and laypeople believe
that allowing juries to make this type of determination will only decrease the fairness and
reliability of the punitive compensation judgment. Additionally, even if juries are fair and
reliable in their decision-making, the question of cost always lingers. Courts may be less
inclined to accept a jury's role in deciding the amount of the remedy if the costs of doing
so outweigh the benefits of having community members make this decision.
This Article begins in Part II by exploring the transformation of criminal restitution
into a primarily punitive, rather than restorative, device. Part II proposes adopting the more
apt denomination, "punitive compensation," to describe this particular remedy, in lieu of
the ill-fitting term "restitution." Part II closes with a discussion of why punitive compen-
sation is the appropriate terminology for the remedy courts employ regularly in criminal
cases.
Part II turns to the question of how the proposed change in terminology translates
into a conclusion that the jury is the preferable entity to determine the amount of punitive
3. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
4. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348 (2012). Distinct from "restitution," criminal fines
are court-ordered payments imposed at sentencing and made to the government solely for the purposes of pun-
ishment.
5. In recent months, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in several cases aimed at solidifying that crim-
inal restitution is indeed a criminal punishment, and therefore subject to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at *2-3, Holmich v. United States, 2014 WL 4727762 (2014) (No. 14-337),
cert. denied, 2015 WL 231975 (2015); Brief of Petitioner at *i, Rosbottom v. United States, 2014 WL 6468917
(2014) (No. 14-570), cert. denied, 2015 WL 133043 (2015). See also, e.g., Lollar, supra note 1; James Barta,
Note, Guarding the Rights ofthe Accused and Accuser: The Jury's Role in Awarding Criminal Restitution under
the Sixth Amendment, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 463 (2014).
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compensation. This Part begins with a discussion of why the Constitution compels the jury
to take the role of fact-finder, and then addresses other normative reasons behind this con-
clusion. After examining why juries theoretically may be better suited to determine the
amount of punitive compensation, Part III also considers the question of whether, on a
practical level, juries can be rational, considered, and consistent in taking on this difficult
task. Part III explores whether submitting highly charged emotional decisions to a jury in
a criminal case-such as how much restitution to impose on a possessor of child pornog-
raphy or on a doctor who has sold pain medications to addicts in the community-is likely
to decrease the accuracy, fairness, and overall legitimacy of the imposition of monetary
punishments.
A review of the current literature on decision-making by juries and judges in similar
areas of law-specifically, decision-making in the context of state-level felony sentencing
hearings and civil punitive damages cases-shows that, contrary to common perception
and intuition, juries are likely to be as even-handed as judges in determining emotionally
charged financial decisions. In light of the jury's favorable status as community represent-
atives, debunking the myth ofjury incompetence adds a further reason to value the jury as
fact-finder in this context.
Drawing on extensive social science literature, Part IV acknowledges and explores
three significant factors challenging effective jury decision-making: anchoring, affective
forecasting, and jury instructions. This social science literature looks at how juries deter-
mine damages and other monetary awards, and what subconscious factors enter into their
decision-making when calculating the amount of a financial award to impose. The anchor-
ing literature reveals that jurors, like judges, are prone to rely on a number they have been
given, even an entirely unrelated number, and unconsciously anchor any numerical deci-
sion to that number. The affective forecasting literature shows jurors are poor predictors
of the duration and degree of a crime victim's future emotional response to the crime,
meaning they are not able to accurately predict the amount of compensation that will ap-
propriately address both the victim's needs and the defendant's punishment.
Finally, literature on jury instructions illuminates another weakness specific to jury
decision-making. Many jury instructions are dense and opaque, leaving jurors confused as
to what the applicable laws and standards are. Jurors often seek to fill in gaps in their
understanding with their own interpretations. Although this rarely ends up affecting the
outcome, studies show poorly-worded jury instructions affect the outcome of civil dam-
ages determinations.
After evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of juries as decision-makers, Part V
turns to the critical question of whether, and how, courts and legislators can address these
weaknesses to place jurors in the best position to determine the appropriate amount of
punitive compensation. Part V proposes several strategies for encouraging and enabling
juries to make thoughtful, reliable, and accurate punitive compensation decisions. This
Article concludes that not only are juries constitutionally empowered to decide punitive
compensation awards, juries are the more appropriate decision-making body to determine
this aspect of criminal sentencing, especially from the perspective of determining how best
to punish violations of our moral norms.
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II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL "RESTITUTION" INTO PUNITIVE
COMPENSATION
Courts impose criminal restitution as punishment.6 Although restitution has long
been an available criminal remedy in the United States,7 until the last forty years, courts
rarely utilized restitution in the criminal context. In the instances when courts did employ
it, restitution operated primarily, if not solely, as a mechanism to prevent unjust enrich-
ment. Restitution required the defendant to disgorge her ill-gotten gains, thereby prevent-
ing her unjust enrichment at the victim's expense.8
Propelled forward by the victims' rights movement, legislatures in the 1980's and
90's adopted restitution as one of several criminal justice reforms aimed at responding to
criticisms regarding the system's treatment of victims.9 Over the course of forty years,
"restitution" went from being a rare occurrence in criminal cases to a common element in
criminal sentencing, ultimately becoming a mandatory requirement for federal judges in
any criminal case involving an "identifiable" victim who "suffered a physical injury or
pecuniary loss" as a result of a convicted defendant's crimes.' 0 Reflecting society's pro-
gressively vengeful approach to criminal defendants and punishment," courts moved
away from imposing criminal restitution as a mechanism to force a defendant to disgorge
her unlawful gains1 2 and began to impose "restitution" as compensation to a victim for
6. This Article relies on the definition of punishment previously articulated by Cortney E. Lollar in What Is
Criminal Restitution?. See Lollar, supra note 1, at 105-22 (defining punishment as a state action subsequent to a
criminal allegation, resulting in a substantial deprivation and/or obligation, and impose pursuant to: a statute that
reveals morally condemnatory intent, a statute with unclear intent but applied in a consistently condemnatory
manner, or with the effect of substantially diminishing a person's well-being as a result of moral condemnation
communicated by a state action).
7. Starting in 1925, federal judges were authorized to order restitution only as a condition of probation.
Woody R. Clermont, It's Never Too Late to Make Amends: Two Wrongs Don't Protect a Victim's Right to Res-
titution, 35 NOVA L. REV. 363, 373 (2011). See also, e.g., United States v. Boswell, 605 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Wilson, 469 F.2d 368, 370 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339, 341-42
(4th Cir. 1963); cf Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-42
(1970)) (explaining that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to convert the statutory ceiling of a pun-
ishment from payment of a fine to imprisonment based solely on an indigent defendant's inability to pay the
fine).
8. See, e.g., Elmar Weitekamp, Can Restitution Serve as a Reasonable Alternative to Imprisonment? An
Assessment of the Situation in the USA, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF
VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION-INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 81, 82 (Heinz Messmer & Hans-
Uwe Otto eds., 1992).
9. In 1982, at the height of the victims' rights movement, Congress passed the federal Victim and Witness
Protection Act ("VWPA"), introducing a new era for restitution. Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Crit-
ical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2009).
10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(1)(B) (West 2006). See generally 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2248,2259, 2264,2327, 3556,
3663.
I1. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY (2001); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); MICHAEL TONRY,
THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004); Sharon Dolovich,
Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259 (2011).
12. Under the VWPA, criminal restitution was no longer limited to repaying the victim the value of money,
goods, or services taken from them; restitution could now be ordered as compensation for physical injuries, and
as time went on, for mental injuries and emotional losses. For the first time, under the VWPA, if the victim
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economic, emotional, and psychological losses.13
As the scope of "restitution" broadened to require a criminal defendant to compen-
sate a victim's losses, the method of calculating what was actually victim compensation
inevitably changed. In most cases, criminal "restitution" became unmoored from the spe-
cific, tangible, economic gains a defendant unlawfully earned at the victim's expense, and
evolved into a guessing game of how much harm a victim experienced, and would continue
to experience throughout her lifetime, as a result of a defendant's criminal action. Whereas
disgorgement rights an economic imbalance, the compensation of evolving, amorphous
emotional and psychological losses aims to right a moral imbalance, requiring payment to
a victim as a consequence for committing a moral wrong.
As a result, reimbursement of a victim's economic losses is only a part of what now
constitutes criminal "restitution." In fact, courts no longer require precise calculations for
many types of "restitution." Rather, in difficult cases, the Supreme Court has urged district
courts to "do their best"l 4 to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, while
discouraging them from using too much precision: "it is neither necessary nor appropriate
to prescribe a precise algorithm" for calculating particular types of criminal "restitution."15
The shift in criminal "restitution's" focus illustrates the remedy's subtle transfor-
mation from a primarily remedial device to a primarily punitive one.16 Through criminal
"restitution" statutes, courts and legislatures now can require defendants to provide victims
with a financial benefit they did not previously possess.' 7 The statutes' legislative histories
confirm their goal of "punish[ing] the bad guy" and "ensur[ing] that the offender realizes
the damage caused by the offense."' 8 Criminal "restitution" has become "compensation
loosely tied to a criminal act and imposed as a consequence of committing a moral
wrong."' 9 Because of its now punitive character, the term restitution no longer fits the
remedy courts utilize daily in criminal cases.
suffered bodily injury, the court could order a defendant to pay for medical, psychiatric or psychological treat-
ment, as well as reimburse the victim for wages lost prior to sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(2), (3) (1982)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2012)). In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") became the
first federal statute to mandate criminal restitution. This was a change from the VWPA, which allowed a court
to decline ordering restitution based on a defendant's indigency. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 3664 (2012)). VAWA required convicted defendants to compensate victims for physical and psycho-
logical injuries inflicted as a result of sex-related and domestic violence crimes, regardless of the defendant's
financial means. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1904 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (2012)).
13. Indeed, some statutes actually require judges to impose restitution for economic and psychological losses.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2259(b)(3)(A), (F), 3663(b)(2)(A) (2012). Federal judges consistently have interpreted
federal restitution statutes as measuring restitution by a victim's losses rather than a defendant's unlawful gains.
See infra Part Il(A).
14. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1715 (2014).
15. Id. at 1728.
16. See Lollar, supra note 1, at 101-22.
17. Id. at 102, 130-48.
18. Id. at 114-15.
19. Id. at 97.
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A. A New Designation
As already indicated, the disgorgement approach to restitution is a rarity in the crim-
inal context,20 calling into question the accuracy of the term "restitution" to describe the
remedy criminal courts utilize as a regular part of sentencing proceedings. By its very
definition, restitution, a legal remedy that remains in regular use in the civil context, is
concerned with unjust enrichment and the disgorgement of unlawful gains. Unjust enrich-
ment is rarely the issue in criminal cases.2 1 Rather, courts impose what is called "restitu-
tion" on criminal defendants to compensate victims based on the moral wrong committed,
in an effort to make the victim "whole." Courts impose this financial penalty partially out
of a desire to compensate victims, but principally to hold the defendant accountable for
her crimes and make her suffer yet another form of criminal punishment.
Because the designation "restitution" inaccurately describes this remedy, its con-
tinued usage causes doctrinal confusion. Restitution in the civil law context remains fo-
cused on disgorgement and unjust enrichment, whereas in the criminal system, "restitu-
tion" usually refers to the compensation of a broad range of tangible and intangible losses.
The tension between the very disparate uses of the term has caused heated debate among
restitution scholars in the United States. 22 These different terminologies, and the inaccu-
racy of the word "restitution" to describe what courts impose in criminal sentencing hear-
ings, has created confusion and led some scholars, including this author, to believe that
"restitution" simply is not the correct word to describe the remedy criminal courts employ
regularly in sentencing hearings.
This Article proposes dividing the remedy courts and legislators currently call crim-
inal "restitution" into two distinct designations: restitution and punitive compensation.
Restitution will remain the denomination for the long-used civil and criminal remedy re-
quiring a defendant to disgorge the amount of her unjust enrichment. "Punitive compen-
sation" describes the remedy that compensates the crime victim for her losses and sends a
message of punishment and accountability to a criminal defendant. Punitive compensation
exists alongside restitution, a term still applicable when a court orders a civil or criminal
defendant to disgorge a tangible, unlawfully obtained economic gain. This Article urges
legislators and courts to adopt this new term to describe the previously undelineated rem-
edy used often in criminal sentencing hearings.
Some have argued that "victim compensation" is the more accurate and easier des-
ignation to describe what this Article labels "punitive compensation." Courts often require
criminal defendants to pay a determined amount of money into a general fund-a crime
20. In the criminal context, forfeiture is now the remedy used to force a defendant to disgorge her unlawful
gains. However, as with criminal fines, the criminal forfeitures go to the government, rather than the crime victim.
21. Criminal forfeiture has become the mechanism courts use to require a criminal defendant to disgorge her
unlawful gains. However, those unlawful gains then go to the government, not the victim.
22. Recent proposed, and then rejected, changes to the Model Penal Code acknowledged the confusion cre-
ated by the use of the word "restitution" to describe two very different sets of compensatory mechanisms. See
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04A cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 10, Sept. 3,2014). The American Law
Institute initially proposed adoption of the more accurate term "victim compensation" to describe what practi-
tioners and legislators refer to as "restitution." Although this terminology was adopted at the 2014 Annual Meet-
ing, in the next Preliminary Draft, the Reporter recommended maintaining the term "restitution," as "victim
compensation" created too much confusion with state and federal Victim of Crime Compensation Funds. See
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04A cmt. b.
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victim compensation fund-that court employees then disburse to crime victims (not nec-
essarily the victim of that particular crime). Victims fill out paperwork and apply for re-
imbursement of various out-of-pocket losses attributable to the actions of some criminal
defendant. If the court administrators of the fund approve the compensation request, those
victims receive reimbursement from the fund.
Because of the prevalence of state and federal Crime Victim Compensation Funds,
many scholars reject the use of "victim compensation." At first blush, the only substantive
difference between criminal "restitution" and payments from the Crime Victim Compen-
sation Fund is the process. The defendant pays "restitution" directly to a particular victim,
whereas a defendant pays into a general fund, and then court clerks disburse the money to
victims from that fund. As a result, one might presume that "victim compensation" actually
is an accurate term for both types of payments, and that criminal "restitution" and crime
victim compensation funds are, at their essence, the same thing.
Yet the rejection of the term "victim compensation" actually reflects a much more
significant distinction between the two processes. Victim compensation funds reimburse
incurred losses. These state-run funds generally require the victim to provide documenta-
tion of the specific losses claimed, and in return, the fund reimburses the victim for the
loss. By contrast, the "restitution" orders judges impose as part of criminal sentencing
hearings rarely require extant, documented losses. Rather, because criminal "restitution"
usually aims to compensate a crime victim for a wider range of losses, including intangible
future emotional and hedonic losses, which judges cannot always pin down to a pre-cal-
culated, mathematical amount, reimbursement is only a small part of "restitution." Alt-
hough the term "victim compensation" might still be descriptively accurate for both rem-
edies, what victim compensation funds do and what criminal "restitution" does are
fundamentally different on both a practical and theoretical level. One reimburses, the other
compensates.
"Punitive compensation" identifies the previously undifferentiated form of punish-
ment that sits alongside restitution, compensates a broader range of losses than victim
compensation, and whose fundamental concern is addressing a defendant's moral blame-
worthiness. 23 The term punitive compensation recognizes that the remedy courts currently
employ in criminal courts is not restitution as common legal parlance understands the term.
It acknowledges that compensation of victims is not limited to easily quantifiable eco-
nomic losses. Punitive compensation appreciates that judges impose this sentencing obli-
gation on criminal defendants as a consequence of committing a moral wrong in an effort
to make the victim "whole."
Distinct from restitution proper, punitive compensation serves twin goals: victim
compensation and condemnation of moral blameworthiness. Legislators and judges aim to
punish those convicted of a crime to the full extent possible by "making them pay," both
figuratively and literally, for committing a crime, and they want to "make victims whole"
by compensating them for the experience of being a crime victim. 24 The term "punitive
23. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Di-
vide, 85 GEO. LJ. 775, 799-806 (1997).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Brock-Davis, 504 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2007); Lollar, supra note 1, at 132.
106 [Vol. 51:99
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compensation" articulates and acknowledges these twin goals, and makes explicit the pu-
nitive aspect of this criminal punishment.
B. Punitive Compensation As Punishment
A close look at how courts impose punitive compensation in criminal cases illus-
trates plainly its corrective character. On the most basic level, the practical effects of fail-
ing to pay punitive compensation, or criminal "restitution" under the current parlance, are
no different from the effects of failing to abide by any other unmistakable form of criminal
punishment, including the failure to pay a criminal fine.25 Failure to pay punitive compen-
sation results in a defendant's continued disenfranchisement, suspension of her driver's
license, continued court supervision, and constant threat of re-incarceration. 26 Each of
these is a consequence that typically results from a criminal conviction, and the effects are
no different with punitive compensation.
Courts also regularly order defendants to compensate a victim for conduct the pros-
ecution has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding. For example,
courts require defendants to compensate third parties for acquitted, unproven, and "rele-
vant" conduct, for harms only indirectly attributable to them, and when there is no actual
loss to a victim. 27 Federal courts have required defendants to pay "restitution" to victims
not named in the indictment,28 for acts occurring during the same course of conduct as the
counts of conviction--even if not close in time and not charged 29-and for events occur-
ring outside of the statute of limitations. 30 Criminal defendants have paid "restitution" even
when the victim has not claimed a loss.3 ' Courts even order defendants to pay for the costs
of their own prosecution under the guise of criminal "restitution." 32
As with other criminal punishments, the failure to pay punitive compensation can
25. To the extent there was any doubt that criminal fines are punishment, Southern Union Co. v. United States
clarified those doubts. 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2349-50 (2012). The distinction between restitution and criminal fines
largely comes down to the recipient: fines are paid to the state/govemment/court system, and restitution is paid
to crime victims.
26. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2010). Cf Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067,
1079-80 (9th Cir. 2010). Additionally, many states do not permit a convicted defendant to seek to seal or expunge
her criminal record unless restitution has been paid. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-308.9(2)(a)(V) (2013); IND.
CODE § 35-38-9-8(b)( 11) (West 2014); IOWA CODE § 907.9(4)(b) (2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.140(5)(3) (West
2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145.5(c) (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991c(C) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
40-105(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7602(b)(1)(C) (2012). Waiting periods for expunge-
ment or record sealing often do not begin to run until a person has paid their restitution in full. For example, in
Wyoming, a person cannot petition for expungement of their record unless at least ten years have passed since
restitution was paid in full. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-1502(a)(i)(C) (West 2011).
27. Lollar, supra note 1, at 130-33.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Henoud, 81 F.3d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d
469, 473 (5th Cir. 1995). Cf United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Reed, 80
F.3d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1996).
29. United States v. Wright, 496 F.3d 371, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (determining that because one scheme was
"practically identical" to scheme of conviction, other than identity of the victims, events were part of common
scheme or plan and restitution to those victims appropriate).
30. United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 2004).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Cliatt, 338 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hackett, 311 F.3d
989, 993 (9th Cir. 2002).
32. See Lollar, supra note 1, at 142-48.
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result in significant, long-term consequences. 33 Criminal defendants often lose their jobs
subsequent to conviction and sentencing, even if they do not receive a sentence of jail
time.34 As a result of unemployment, many convicted defendants have trouble paying off
a "restitution" obligation, which is often all that remains for them to have completed their
sentence. Fulfilling this monetary obligation can become an insurmountable hurdle. "Res-
titution" obligations show up on a credit report for seven years, and any difficulties in
keeping up with such payments can add another obstacle to securing employment, while
also creating the potential for disqualification from food stamps, low-income housing,
housing assistance, federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) funds, and
other benefits.35
Punitive compensation recognizes that courts regularly impose this remedy as a pun-
ishment, in an attempt to address the moral harm a criminal defendant's action caused, not
simply as a mechanism for reimbursement of a victim's concrete losses. By placing a con-
crete dollar amount on intangible harms, courts attempt to quantify the appropriate amount
of monetary compensation for a defendant's moral transgression, sometimes without proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that such a transgression occurred.
III. WHY JURIES SHOULD DECIDE THE AMOUNT
OF PUNITIVE COMPENSATION
Punitive compensation is the apt term to describe the remedy regularly imposed in
criminal cases. This designation reflects the remedy's undisputable shift from reimburse-
ment to compensation, and reminds us that punitive compensation is, at its essence, a crim-
inal punishment. Recognizing punitive compensation's character as punishment raises two
parallel issues worth exploring: first, does acknowledging punitive compensation's cor-
rective character carry constitutional implications, and second, separate and apart from the
constitutional considerations, are judges the best fact-finders to be calculating the appro-
priate amount of punitive compensation in a given case? Part III considers these questions
in turn.
A. Constitutional Considerations
Supreme Court precedent requires "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum [to] be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 36 In 2012, the Court applied
33. Id. at 124.
34. R. Boshier & Derek Johnson, Does Conviction Affect Employment Opportunities?, 14 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 264 (1974); Devah Pager, The Mark ofa Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. Soc. 937, 942-43, 955-57,
959 (2003); Richard Schwartz & Jerome Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc. PROBS. 133 (1962);
Bruce Western, The Impact ofIncarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 526,528 (2002)
(noting men in trusted or high-income positions prior to conviction experience large earnings losses after release
from prison, and that felony conviction can disqualify someone from employment in certain fields).
35. Lollar, supra note 1, at 125; ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 28 (2010).
36. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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this rule to criminal fines in Southern Union Co. v. United States.37 As a result, the prose-
cution must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases the maximum
amount of a criminal fine.38 This logic would seem to apply equally to punitive compen-
sation-the prosecution should have to prove any fact that increases the amount of punitive
compensation to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although punitive compensation operates as a punishment, under the auspices of
criminal "restitution," courts have not afforded it the constitutional protections reserved
for other criminal punishments.39 Instead, every circuit court to consider whether the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right applies to criminal "restitution" has declined to grant it this
constitutional protection.40 The Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
has not changed that result.41
Most courts have declined to extend the rule to criminal "restitution" by asserting
that the federal restitution statutes do not contain a maximum sentence. According to most
federal courts, "the single restitution amount triggered by the conviction. . .is the full
amount of [each victim's] loss."42 In other words, according to this view, criminal "resti-
tution" has no statutory minimum or maximum; it is measured solely by the "full amount
37. S. Union. Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
38. Id. at 2348.
39. See Lollar, supra note 1, at 148-54.
40. Id. at 150 & n.217. Prior to Southern Union, the case in which the Supreme Court found Sixth Amend-
ment protections applicable to criminal fines, ten circuits rejected the Sixth Amendment's application to criminal
restitution on the ground that it contains no statutory maximum sentence. See United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d
328, 337-38 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390 (1st Cir. 2006); United States
v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118-20 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1310-11 (11th Cir.
2006); United States v. Bussell, 414 F.3d 1048, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 170
(5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470,473 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Miller,
419 F.3d 791, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 454, 461 (6th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit rejects Apprendi's application
to criminal restitution based on its longstanding precedent rejecting criminal restitution as punishment. United
States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216-18 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing "well-established" and "long-standing" precedent
that "restitution is not a criminal penalty").
41. Lollar, supra note 1, at 150 n.218. After Southern Union, four of the five circuits to address this question
have continued to reject the Sixth Amendment's application to criminal restitution on the grounds that "there is
no prescribed statutory maximum in the restitution context." United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir.
2012); see also United States v. Roemmele, No. 13-14255, 2014 WL 6952961, at * 1-2 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2014);
United States v. Jarjis, No. 13-1430, 2014 WL 260321, at * I(6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2014) (per curiam); United States
v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging, additionally, the Ninth Circuit's own conflicting
precedent as to whether restitution is punishment). Courts have been more willing to apply the protections of the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause to criminal "restitution." Lollar, supra note 1, at 152-54. In its re-
cent Paroline decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that criminal restitution may be subject to the consti-
tutional protections of the Excessive Fines Clause. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1719, 1726 (2014). Pre-
Southern Union, four circuits recognized that criminal restitution fell under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause protections: the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Dighlawi, 452 F.
App'x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding restitution subject to Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment);
United States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 899 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 342 (4th
Cir. 2003) (finding restitution subject to Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); United States v.
Suarez, 215 F. App'x 872, 879 (11 th Cir. 2007) (applying Excessive Fines analysis in determining whether res-
titution order violated Eighth Amendment); United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 419-20 (4th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144-46 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding criminal restitution subject to Eighth Amend-
ment Excessive Fines Clause). The Third Circuit did not appear to challenge this conclusion. Cf United States
v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2007) (assuming, arguendo, that Excessive Fines Clause applies to
restitution, court rejects conclusion that the Eighth Amendment was violated in this case).
42. United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 337-38 (3d Cir. 2006).
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of [each victim's] loss." As a result, courts conclude the Sixth Amendment is inapplicable
to punitive compensation. 43
As some judges and scholars have acknowledged, this reasoning fails to recognize
"[r]estitution in any amount greater than zero clearly increases the punishment that could
otherwise be imposed."44 Although they may not acknowledge their role in the process,
judges currently make the factual determination as to what the "full amount" of a victim's
loss is, a determination that almost always requires some factual inquiry, often a rather
challenging and involved inquiry.45 As one judge noted, "no restitution can be imposed
absent a judicial determination of the amount of loss."46 As a result, courts' rejection of
the Sixth Amendment's application to punitive compensation is unconvincing and una-
vailing.
Ifjudges were imposing only restitution-the disgorgement of a defendant's unlaw-
ful gains-this argument might carry more weight. Ascertaining concrete economic gains
a defendant receives is often a much more straightforward inquiry. As already discussed,
however, judges impose punitive compensation measured by a victim's losses-past and
future, tangible and intangible-during the criminal sentencing process. On a daily basis,
judges determine both what monetary amount will "make a victim whole," and what
amount will signal to the defendant the wrongfulness of her action, deter her from com-
mitting future crimes, and punish her for her transgression. This inquiry is quite distinct
from a restitution measurement.
Punitive compensation is a punishment, and as a result, the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right should be afforded to defendants faced with paying punitive compensation.
B. Juries as Community Representatives Should Determine Punitive Compensation
Amounts
Given punitive compensation's use as a criminal penalty, courts should recognize
the same constitutional protections as other criminal penalties seems fairly straightfor-
ward. As compelling as this reasoning may be, courts continue to reject the application of
Sixth Amendment constitutional protections to criminal "restitution." The imposition of
punitive compensation carries normative, practical considerations, however, in addition to
constitutional ones. The practical case for a jury determination of punitive compensation
is equally, if not more, compelling than the constitutional one.
Juries are "the embodiment of the ideal of a decentralized democracy." 47 Juries, as
democratic institutions, have the moral authority to make difficult judgments in criminal
cases. As scholar Jenia lontcheva noted, "[c]ertain features of juries are particularly con-
ducive to democratic deliberation. Random sampling, together with a robust jurisprudence
prohibiting racial, ethnic, or gender-based discrimination in jury selection, promotes the
43. Lollar, supra note 1, at 151 n.222.
44. Leahy, 438 F.3d at 342-43 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Lollar, supra
note 1, at 151.
45. Lollar, supra note 1, at 151-52.
46. Leahy, 438 F.3d at 342 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Jenia lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Principle, 89 VA. L. REv. 311, 323 (2003).
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inclusivity of the jury." 48 Determining what punishment to impose is an indication of a
community's values and priorities, placing juries in the prime position to make this key
judgment.49  As one judge commented,
There is nothing I do as a trial court judge that makes me more uncom-
fortable than when I impose criminal sentences. It is not just a matter of
emotional and policy tensions inherent in the act of sentencing. It is an
institutional discomfort-a nagging feeling that this is a moral act and
not a legal one, and that one person should no more have the power to
select an arbitrary sentencing within a wide legislatively prescribed
range than to declare certain acts to be crimes in the first instance. The
demise of rehabilitation, and the reemergence of retribution, has made it
clear that the act of sentencing is indeed a moral act.50
Jurors, as a group of community representatives, make moral assessments regarding
the quality of a person's actions and the best manner for appraising and addressing the
blameworthiness of those actions. In the context of criminal sentencing decisions, this ap-
proach is preferable to leaving those decisions in the hands of one individual.5 ' As one
commentator observed, "[tihe value of jury sentencing lies in mediating, through a con-
versation across rival discourses, among different aims and models of punishment."5 2
48. Id. at 346-37.
49. Although this Article is focused specifically on moral compensation, this argument could well be ex-
tended to address the jury's role in all types of sentencing decisions.
50. Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 994-95 (2003).
51. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 363-64, 367-69 (1996); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emo-
tions, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 355, 358 (2008), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestem.edu/cgi/view-
content.cgi?article=l I15&context-nulronline. lontcheva, supra note 47, at 346-47.
A historical, originalist argument strongly supports juries playing a key role in criminal sentencing decisions.
Several scholars have written about juries' central role in determining criminal sentences for most of our nation's
history. Hoffman, supra note 50, at 957-58; lontcheva, supra note 47, at 316. In the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, as the newly formed states of the United States began to consider how best to enforce and
punish their criminal laws, a few states chose to delegate the power to determine a defendant's punishment to
juries. Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return ofJury Sentencing: Misgivings about Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. REV. 621,
641-44 (2004). Initially, only two of the thirteen states adopted this approach, but by the second half of the
nineteenth century, eleven states placed the non-capital sentencing decision in the hands ofjurors. Id. at 644-45
n.107; lontcheva, supra note 47, at 317 n.28. Still today, six states continue to use juries as decision-makers in
felony sentencing hearings. See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice:
A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885 (2004). Juries decided both questions of law and fact, and in many
states, the authority of the criminal jury to determine questions of law was assumed to be self-evident. lontcheva,
supra note 47, at 319-20. Jurors stepped comfortably into their role as the voice of community within the confines
of the courthouse.
Over much of the last century, the rise of the legal class and the professionalization of punishment led to an
emphasis on expertise rather than community wisdom, and many states moved away from having juries deter-
mine felony sentences. lontcheva, supra note 47, at 324-26. Although most states and the federal system now
place the felony sentencing decision squarely in the hands of the judge, six states retain a sentencing scheme that
allows juries to decide a defendant's felony sentence. Lillquist, supra, at 646; King & Noble, supra, at 886. Those
six states are: Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia. Even within jury felony sentencing
states, many defendants are sentenced by judges because defendants often waive jury sentencing, particularly in
cases where the defendant has pled guilty rather than proceeded to trial. Lillquist, supra, at 647. Recent estimates
suggest that juries determine approximately 4,000 felony sentences per year. King & Noble, supra, at 887 n.4.
This data is approximately ten years old, however; it has been difficult to obtain more up-to-date information.
52. lontcheva, supra note 47, at 344.
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Judges do not have the benefit of such a dialogue or the moral legitimacy of the group
decision that ultimately results.
Despite both the increasing recognition ofjuries' constitutionally compelled respon-
sibility for determining punitive compensation, and the appeal of utilizing juries to deter-
mine the appropriate award, many have concerns about jurors and their ability to make
accurate and thoughtful decisions in the criminal sentencing context.
An examination of two areas of scholarship-studies of criminal felony sentencing
and civil punitive damages-reveals that judge and jury decision-making is not so differ-
ent from one another. Thus, the fear that juries are less reliable and more biased in their
decision-making turns out to have little empirical support. In reviewing the literature on
felony jury sentencing, the emerging consensus is that juries make markedly similar deci-
sions to judges in determining the appropriate criminal sanction to impose. In light of this
similarity in the results juries and judges reach, and the advantage juries have of better
representing the composition and experiences of the community as a whole, on balance,
jurors become the preferable fact-finder for determining the degree of moral blameworthi-
ness a defendant's action caused and how best to punish someone for that violation of our
community's mores. In the context of punitive compensation, juries emerge as the desira-
ble entity to calculate how much monetary compensation is likely to both adequately com-
pensate a victim of crime for her losses and appropriately punish the defendant for her
morally blameworthy actions. The following subsections take a closer look at these find-
ings.
1. The Importance of a Racially and Gender-Diverse Jury
A review of felony sentencing literature reveals that race, gender, class, and disabil-
ity status play significant roles in both judge and jury decision-making. Although many
juries remain more homogenous than the community at large, on average, they are more
likely to represent the views of a broader and more diverse community than judges. Jurors
are not only likely to be a more diverse group when it comes to race, gender, and disability,
especially in jurisdictions that draw from a jury pool selected by something other than
voter registration records, they are much more likely to be economically diverse. Because
of their range of backgrounds, jurors bring a wider array of perspectives to the decision
about what monetary award would sufficiently compensate a crime victim for the moral
transgression the defendant committed. As a result, assuming the jury reflects the commu-
nity, the monetary award they elect has a greater probability of adequately reflecting the
consensus of the community. Thus, jurors are the preferable entity to determine the appro-
priate punishment for a violation of community mores, especially the appropriate amount
of punitive compensation to impose.
Judges, as a group, are not representative of the larger society.53 Although federal
judges as a whole are increasingly diverse, both racially and by gender, both the absolute
numbers and the percentages are still small. As of February 2015, only approximately 29%
53. Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role of Juries in Eighth Amendment Punishments
Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REv. 549, 560 n.66 (2012).
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of the entire federal judiciary was female, in contrast with a population that was almost
51% female. 54 Although about 16% of Americans are Latino, only 9% of federal judges
are Latino, and only 2% of federal judges are Asian-American, although almost 5% of
Americans are of Asian descent.55 On average, judges tend to be older than the average
American, and much more educated. 56 Most judges have law degrees, whereas fewer than
a third of Americans have completed college.57
At the state level, where most judges sit and most criminal cases are litigated, judges
are even less reflective of society. The percentage of state judges who are racial minorities
ranges from 0% in Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wyoming to 65.1%
in Hawaii.58 Nationwide, an average of 9.3% of state court judges are racial minorities,
compared with a population rate of 37.4%.59 Of those, approximately 54% are African-
American, approximately 11% are of Asian descent, and approximately 28% are of His-
panic descent.60 Hawaii is the only state with a higher percentage of state court judges who
are racial minorities than the national population average.61 As indicated previously,
women constitute almost 51% of the overall national population. At the state level, Hawaii
has the highest percentage of female judges, at 34.9%, closely followed by Massachusetts,
at 34.2%.62 West Virginia comes in last, with 5.6% female judges. 63 Like federal judges,
almost all state judges are required to have a law degree,6 which again distinguishes them
from the average population. In short, no state comes close to having a bench that mirrors
the general population.
By contrast, juries, as Justice Stevens famously noted, "reflect more accurately the
54. Federal Judiciary Center, Biographical Directory of Sitting Judges, Fed. Judiciary Center, at
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 1 have calculated these per-
centages based on the numbers of sitting judges, not limiting that number to active judges, as many senior judges
maintain significant case loads. See also Nat'l Women's Law Center, Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a
Long Way to Go, http://www.nwlc.org/resource/women-federal-judiciary-still-long-way-go-l (Jan. 9, 2015);
Ryan, supra note 53, at 560.
55. Federal Judiciary Center, Biographical Directory of Sitting Judges, Fed. Judiciary Center, at
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2015); Ryan, supra note 53, at 560
n.67. Notably, the percentage of African-American judges mirrors the percentage of African-Americans in the
country at large.
56. Ryan, supra note 53, at 560.
57. Id.
58. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY IN STATE COURTS, at
http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd/display/national.cfm (June 2010) (last viewed Feb. 4, 2015); Malia Red-
dick et al., Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, 48 ABA JUDGES' J. 1, 3 tbl. 1 (2009),
available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Racial-and-Gender-Diver-
sity onStat_8F60B84D96CC2.pdf.
59. Reddick et al., supra note 58, at 3, tbl. 1; U.S. Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ta-
ble/PST045214/00 (last viewed Feb. 4, 2015) (62.6% of Americans are white "alone, not Hispanic or Latino").
Obviously this average does not account for the differences in the population of racial minorities, either as a
whole or by group, from state to state. For a closer look at the state-by-state breakdown, see Reddick et al., supra
note 58, at 3, tbl. 1; U.S. Census Bureau, available at http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045214/00.
60. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY IN STATE COURTS,
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd/display/national.cfm (June 2010) (last viewed Feb. 4, 2015).
61. Id.
62. Reddick et al., supra note 58, at 3, tbl. 1.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2.
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composition and experiences of the community as a whole."65 As a result, they are "more
attuned to the community's moral sensibility." 66 In fact, studies show that diverse juries
tend to deliberate longer and more thoroughly than all-white juries. 67 The jury deliberation
process encourages dialogue among people from different backgrounds, increasing the
odds that the judgments reached will be both more informed and more reflective of the
whole community's view. 68 As one scholar noted, "[j]urors learn from each other in the
process of deliberation and perhaps reach solutions that would not have occurred to them
individually." 69
This collaborative, deliberative process is especially important when determining a
criminal punishment such as punitive compensation. After all, punishments reflect soci-
ety's view of the best method for communicating punitive condemnation for an offender's
actions. Substantial evidence exists that, in general, whites and people of color have dif-
ferent life experiences based on race, which leads them to different conclusions about to
what degree certain behaviors violate our moral, as well as legal, codes and what the ap-
propriate sanction, monetary or otherwise, should be.70
Many people of color also have different perspectives on crime, police, and the crim-
inal justice system than many whites.7 ' A fairly recent study of criminal juries in Florida
revealed that having at least one black juror in a jury pool plays a significant role in con-
viction rates. Strikingly, the presence of one or two black jurors in the jury pool results in
a 10% drop in the conviction rates of black defendants, and a 7% increase in the conviction
rates of white defendants. 72 This effect impacts trial outcomes even when black jurors are
not seated on the final jury. 73 The scientists conducting the study concluded "even small
changes in the composition of a jury pool have a large impact on average conviction rates
65. Ring v. Arizona, 535 U.S. 584, 616 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id.
67. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF
CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES 39 (2014), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publica-
tions/rdRace andPunishment.pdf. Many scholars seem to presume that the greater the jury's diversity, the
more likely the jury will be unable to reach a result. Diane E. Courselle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy,
Jury Independence, and Jury Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 238 (2005). At least one study failed to find evidence
of such a correlation. Kenneth S. Klein & Theodore D. Klastorin, Do Diverse Juries Aid or Impede Justice?,
1999 Wis. L. REV. 553, 565 (1999). Rather, most studies indicate that hung juries primarily result from disputes
over the evidence. See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the
National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1276-77 (2003); Kate Mar-
quess, Juries Hung Up on Close Calls, Study Says, 1 No. 40 ABA J. E-REP. 3 (Oct. 18, 2002).
68. lontcheva, supra note 47, at 341.
69. Id.
70. Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section Guarantee
by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 185 (2012); Amy Farrell et al., Juror Perceptions
of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 773,
777, 793-96 (2013); GHANDNOOSH, supra note 67, at 19.
71. Chemoff, supra note 70, at 185; Farrell et al., supra note 70, at 774; Nour Kteily & Sarah Cotterill, Is the
Defendant White or Not?, N.Y. TIMES OPED SR9 (Jan. 25, 2015). See also Ana Swanson, Whites greatly over-
estimate the share ofcrimes committed by black people, WASH. POST WONKBLOG, available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/12/01 /whites-greatly-overestimate-the-share-of-crimes-committed-
by-black-people (Dec. 1, 2014).
72. Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact ofJury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1019 (2012).
73. Id. at 1020.
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for black versus white defendants." 74 Troublingly, they also determined that "defendants
of each race do relatively better when the jury pool contains more members of their own
race." 75
Other studies show that white Americans consistently overestimate the proportion
of crime committed by people of color.76 White people also experience less crime than do
people of color, resulting in white individuals having less frequent, and more positive,
experiences with the criminal justice system.77 White individuals who more strongly asso-
ciate crime with people of color, are more likely to be punitive in their approach to crime
as well.7 8 They have more of a tendency to desire retaliation, less of a tendency to contex-
tualize a defendant's behavior, and less willingness to forgive.79
Thus a juror's racial background can play a significant role in how she approaches
a criminal sentencing decision, and what she thinks the fair amount of punitive compen-
sation may be. Given that no single theory of punishment prevails in either public opinion
polls or legislative policy,80 one of the values of jury sentencing is that it allows for a
"conversation across rival discourses, among different aims and models of punishment."*8
Those who might be inclined to take a more punitive approach in a particular case have to
negotiate and mediate a sentence with those who contextualize a defendant's behavior and
take a more rehabilitative approach. What one juror might view as an award that appropri-
ately compensates the victim and punishes the defendant might be far too little or far too
much according to another juror's views.
Despite those different perspectives, jurors have to decide, collectively, on an as-
sessment of the harm caused by the offender and the blameworthiness attributable to her.
As a group, jurors must work through and reach a consensus about what amount of com-
pensation is appropriate in a given case. They must decide what amount of money ade-
quately compensates a victim for her losses and punishes a defendant for her actions. Once
all jurors agree on the appropriate moral condemnation to be communicated and how best
to translate that into a punishment, including a monetary punishment, that decision holds
more legitimacy than that reached by an individual judge, whose decision may or may not
reflect the community's views as a whole.82 Collective decision-making increases the like-
lihood that the amount awarded reflects the views of the larger community on the defend-
ant's crime and the harm to the victim.
Of course, the condition that a jury sufficiently represent the full range of perspec-
tives and views of all of the community is critical to the legitimacy of this approach. Un-
fortunately, jurisdictions regularly prevent minority jurors from serving on juries because
of how they select jury pools. Most jurisdictions select jury pools from voter registration
74. Id. at 1021.
75. Id.
76. GHANDNOOSH, supra note 67, at 5-6.
77. Id. at 6, 10-12.
78. Id. at 18-19.
79. Id. at 19.
80. Iontcheva, supra note 47, at 343.
81. Id. at 344.
82. Id.
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records. By and large, state laws prohibit individuals who are not registered to vote from
serving on juries because jurors are selected from voter registration lists. As of 2014, fel-
ony convictions prohibited 5.85 million voters in the United States from voting.83 The
impact of disenfranchisement laws is particularly significant for African-Americans, who
are four times more likely to lose their voting rights than the rest of the population.84 Na-
tionwide, one in every thirteen black adults cannot vote as a result of felon disenfranchise-
ment laws.85 Many states permit disenfranchisement for life, even after a person has fin-
ished serving her sentence and completed all other court-ordered obligations.86 In fact,
state laws prohibit approximately 2.6 million people from voting, despite these individuals
having completed their sentences.87 The numbers of potential jurors, particularly black
jurors, who are excluded from service because they are not on the voting registration lists
parallels the disenfranchisement numbers. Because of reliance on voter registration lists,
those at the lowest end of the socio-economic spectrum, as well as many racial minorities,
are systematically underrepresented in the jury venire.88
The result is "minority underrepresentation in jury composition, most notably in the
makeup of the jury pool from which the jury ultimately is selected." 89 Given the im-
portance of a juror's racial background to the process and ultimate outcome of a case, the
consistent and pervasive underrepresentation of African-American and Latino jurors in the
jury pool is particularly troubling.90 As one scholar has noted, this underrepresentation
"diminishes the quality of deliberation about issues frequently relevant in criminal tri-
als." 91 These issues include the degree of moral blameworthiness of a defendant's actions,
and the appropriate punishment, monetary or otherwise, for the moral transgression. En-
suring jury pools represent a fair cross-section of the community is therefore critical to
ensuring that jurors adequately represent the views of the community at large.
Another common issue linked to race and class, and important in the context of pu-
nitive compensation, arises during jury deliberations. Those in what some sociologists
term "low-status" groups-for example, those who are less-educated, sometimes women,
sometimes those of a minority race-often participate less in jury deliberations, and are
less willing to "correct" the majority view when a consensus emerges contrary to their own
view. 92 This remains true even when that juror has unique and important information to
83. The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer I (Apr. 2014), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd Felony%20Disenfranchisement%20Primer.pdf.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id. at 1.
88. VALERIE P. HANS &NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 53-57 (1986); RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 30-33 (1980); David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple
Source Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 776, 803-11 (1977). Another issue that arises with some jurors, particularly in
the Latino community, is language. Less than fluent English speakers are regularly excluded from jury panels,
often lessening the percentage of the panel who are Latino.
89. See Chemoff, supra note 70, at 145.
90. Id. at 145-46.
91. Id. at 185.
92. J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely Revolution, 2006
116 [Vol. 51:99
PUNITIVE COMPENSATION
contribute to the discussion. 93 When these jurors do contribute their perspective, with in-
formation that would be beneficial in ensuring the group reaches the most accurate deci-
sion, other jurors are often judgmental and disapproving, especially if such information is
not offered early in the decision-making process. 94 The inevitable result is that after wait-
ing to contribute and then being shot down by her peers, that juror is less likely to contrib-
ute her perspective as the discussions proceed. 95 This dynamic is unlikely to change when
one is determining the appropriate amount of money to require a criminal defendant to pay
to a cnme victim.
A jury pool drawn from various backgrounds has the best chance of evaluating the
appropriate financial punishment for the violation of community mores committed by the
defendant. An action that might seem to be a significant moral transgression to one juror
might be viewed as less morally blameworthy to someone with a different relationship to
the law, different interpretations of a defendant's actions, and different views on the effec-
tiveness of a particular type of punishment in lieu of the goals they see criminal punish-
ment as serving. Having to mediate the various goals of punishment and the differing
views of how to attain those goals requires people from different backgrounds to reach
some type of resolution that satisfies them both, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the
ultimate punitive compensation award imposed.
2. The Importance of a Socio-Economically Diverse Jury
In the context of punitive compensation, the importance of having decision-makers
with diverse socio-economic backgrounds also cannot be overemphasized. Traditionally,
judges have come from the upper classes, raising concerns about judicial bias toward
wealthy interests. 96 Our nation's founders envisioned juries as protecting parties from a
presumed judicial bias toward wealthy and powerful citizens.97 Indeed, as noted already,
almost all judgeswe have attained a particular status as a result of their education that
distinguishes them from the average American. By contrast, the jury selection process
tends to exclude the most powerful and well-off jurors from service.98 Yet the method of
selecting the jury pool also eliminates those who are poorer and lacking in economic and
social power.99 The result is a jury pool decidedly of the middle class.
A person's socio-economic background will likely be a significant factor in estab-
lishing her view of the appropriate amount of punitive compensation to award. Evidence
has shown that jury trials held in counties with higher poverty rates often result in higher
U. ILL. L. REv. 301, 349 (2006); Cass Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation and Infor-
mation Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 987, 998-99 (2005); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury De-
liberations, I13 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1281-1308 (2000).
93. Prescott & Starr, supra note 92, at 349; Sunstein, supra note 92 at 994, 996-97, 998-99.
94. Prescott & Starr, supra note 92, at 349; Sunstein, supra note 92, at 998-1000.
95. Prescott & Starr, supra note 92, at 349; Sunstein, supra note 92, at 998-1000.
96. Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence ofJuries: Comparing the Capital Sen-
tencing and Punitive Damages Doctrine, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 1255, 1282 (1996).
97. Id.; Alan Howard Scheiner, Note: Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment,
and the Politics ofJury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 153 (1991).
98. SIMON, supra note 88, at 30-31.
99. Scheiner, supra note 97, at 168.
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damage awards, suggesting a sort of rough attempt to level the economic playing field. 00
Other studies have shown that in most other places, juries award white plaintiffs and plain-
tiffs with higher socio-economic status more in damages.o10 Although the results may dif-
fer depending on the location, in each instance, the socio-economic background of the
community members plays a role in determining what the jurors see as the appropriate
amount of monetary compensation. As a result, ensuring that a jury pool comes from an
economic background that mirrors the community where the jury was selected is vital.
Although the voir dire process may eliminate individuals at either extreme of the socio-
economic spectrum, the jury's role as community representative requires a more diverse
economic background than a single judge can provide.
A jury pool drawn from the spectrum of socio-economic backgrounds has the best
chance of evaluating the appropriate amount of a financial award, such as an award of
punitive compensation, for the same reasons that a jury drawn from varying racial back-
grounds will result in a fairer result. An award that might seem only mildly punitive to a
judge or juror who comes from a wealthier background might be viewed as a cripplingly
sanction to a juror who cannot imagine ever having access to that amount of money. Hav-
ing to mediate both the goals of punishment and the differing views of how to attain those
goals requires people from different economic circumstances to reach some type of reso-
lution that satisfies them both.
C. Juries Are As Fair and Consistent As Judges
Many people believe that, even if our system has compelling reasons for including
jurors in the trial process, certain weaknesses in the jury process prevent jurors from being
fair and impartial in the most challenging decisions, such as punitive damages or felony
sentencing decisions. Surprisingly, the literature evaluating jury decision-making illumi-
nates a significant finding in the context of determining punitive compensation: when it
comes to deciding the appropriate sentence, in the main, judges and juries make compara-
ble decisions. We see this in the literature examining jury sentencing in felony cases, as
well as in the punitive damages literature from civil cases.1 02
Although few are aware that some states permit juries to determine a criminal sen-
tence, allowing juries to determine the amount of punitive compensation to award in a
particular criminal sentencing hearing is not novel. Through the early twentieth century,
juries determined the amount of financial punishment and restitution to impose in a given
100. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and the Jury, 16 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 306, 309-10 (2000); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries By Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark
for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 485 (2005).
101. MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY 34-37
(1984); Francis Dane & Lawrence Wrightsman, Effects of Defendants' and Victims' Characteristics on Jurors'
Verdicts, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (Robert Bray & Norbert Kerr eds., 1982).
102. Ideally, in examining how juries determine the appropriate amount of monetary punishment to impose,
we also would have literature from the criminal fine context to evaluate. Southern Union v. United States, the
Supreme Court case applying the Sixth Amendment jury trial right to criminal fines, came down in 2012. Yet,
very few written opinions have been issued discussing any aspect of how the jury trial right is playing out in that
context. From what this author has seen, only one opinion has begun to grapple with the best structure to allow
ajury to evaluate the evidence regarding what fine to impose. See United States v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09-
CR-I 10, 2012 WL 2120452 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012). As a result, we have very little information from the
criminal area regarding how juries make determinations regarding financial penalties.
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criminal case. The quiet presence of felony sentencing juries in six states still today pro-
vides us with important information to consider in determining how juries make sentenc-
ing decisions, and whether a jury is sufficiently impartial to be trusted to calculate the
appropriate amount of punitive compensation in a particular case. Several scholars have
examined judge and jury sentencing in the criminal context, and this Section discusses that
scholarship.
Punitive compensation decisions are surprisingly similar to judgments about puni-
tive damages in several key ways. At their essence, they are both decisions about how
much compensation to give a victim based on both the amount of her documented losses
and her anticipated emotional and hedonic losses. In the criminal context, punitive com-
pensation determinations come with a moral overlay and implicate the direct and collateral
consequences that attach to all criminal punishments, a fundamental difference from pu-
nitive damages.10 3 This distinction does not prevent the punitive damages literature from
revealing several important issues equally relevant in the criminal punitive compensation
context.
The punitive damages literature confirms judges and jurors reach similar decisions
when determining monetary compensation, just as they do in criminal sentencings. This
result may be surprising in light of the common misperception that juries are arbitrary and
disproportionately punishing in their punitive damage awards. Evidence shows, however,
we should not be concerned about allowing juries to step into their role, arguably their
constitutionally required role, of determining the appropriate amount of punitive compen-
sation in a particular case. These next Sections examine this research in more detail.
1. Judges and Juries Reach Similar Conclusions in Criminal Sentencing
On average, juries make the same decisions as judges in felony cases. In the bulk of
criminal trials, judges and juries agree on the outcome of the case-on the finding of guilt
or innocence,'0 and on the general degree of wrongfulness of the defendant's behavior.105
Thus, at first blush, we should have little concern that juries will make any markedly dif-
ferent determination of a defendant's moral blameworthiness than judges will.
When it comes to the amount of punishment to impose, however, judge and jury
decision-making diverges somewhat. Despite agreeing on the degree of a defendant's
wrongfulness, in particular types of cases, juries and judges differ on what punishment
adequately addresses that wrongful conduct. Initially, the existing empirical evidence ap-
pears to conflict: Some evidence suggests that judges impose less severe sentences than
103. Lollar, supra note 1, at 123-30; Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L.
REv. 623, 634-39 (2006).
104. Theodor Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication ofKalven and
Zeisel's The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005) (indicating that judges and juries agreed
on the outcome about seventy-five percent of the time).
105. Prescott & Starr, supra note 92, at 325-26. In cases where the judges and juries disagreed, judges were
more likely to convict. Id. See also Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH.
U. L. REV. 151, 151 (2005).
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juries; 0 6 other studies trend in the opposite direction, indicating that judges are harsher
than jurors in sentencing. 0 7 More nuanced reviews of felony jury sentencing explain the
seeming discrepancy in these findings. These studies reveal that juries overall are more
lenient than judges, 0 8 but in particular types of cases, they impose harsher sentences. Spe-
cifically, juries tend to impose harsher sentences in theft, sex abuse, and drug cases. 0 9
In some cases, juries also impose more disparate sentences than judges.I10 In many
states, juries imposed a more severe average sentence after a jury trial than after a bench
trial or guilty plea.I In some states, however, post-jury trial sentences were more con-
sistent than those imposed by ajudge after a guilty plea.1 2 One notable exception involved
sentences of incarceration: when comparing only sentences of incarceration, juries still
imposed less consistent sentences than those judges imposed for the same offense." 3
The inconsistency in juror sentences may cause some initial hesitation or concern as
to whether jurors should determine punitive compensation amounts. But the discrepancy
has a legitimate explanation: the difference in information jurors and judges receive prior
to sentencing.14 Juries often have less information on which to reach a realistic conclusion
about the harms caused by these crimes. Judges are privy to much more information about
the harms stemming from these offenses and, having seen many of these cases, may have
reached the conclusion that the harms are less significant than jurors believe.
Juries also tend to lack information about alternatives to incarceration." 5 For exam-
ple, jurors often do not understand how parole works; they assume if they impose a sen-
tence with parole, the person will get parole."l 6 Juries do not receive information about
probation, suspended sentences, or treatment options." 7 As a result, jurors believe that
prisons and jails offer more treatment and programs than those institutions generally do." 8
Depending on whether jail seems like a viable option, a juror might make a different, and
more extreme, sentencing choice than she might if she knew the full range of sentencing
106. Brian H. Bornstein, Judges vs. Juries, 43 COURT REV. 56, 58 (2006).
107. Shari S. Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth ofJudicial Leniency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
73 (1989).
108. See, e.g., Robbennolt, supra note 100, at 499-500.
109. See, e.g., King & Noble, supra note 51, at 898; Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital
Cases: A Case Study ofEl Paso County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3,9-10, 33 (1994). See also
King & Noble, supra note 51, at 927-28, 934 (observing that juries tend to impose higher sentences in drug cases
than judges). Additionally, as with trial judges, jury sentences imposed after trial often are greater than those
imposed following a plea. King & Noble, supra note 51, at 895, 926. In other words, just as judges do, juries
impose a "trial penalty" on criminal defendants.
110. Weninger, supra note 109, at 9, 29.
Ill. King & Noble, supra note 51, at 923-24. Sentences for rape were the exception to that general trend.
Evidence seemed to suggest that the choice of fact-finder or whether the conviction was obtained by trial or plea
had no bearing on sentencing decisions for that crime. But see Weninger, supra note 109, at 36 (noting that in
trial cases in El Paso County, Texas, juries sentence less severely than judges).
112. King & Noble, supra note 51, at 907.
113. Id.
114. Id.at899,931.
115. Id. at 931.
116. Id. at 899, 914.
117. King & Noble, supra note 51, at 911 ("Juries do not receive information about probation or suspension
of sentence or about rehabilitative services.").
118. Id. at 899-900.
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options.
Linked to the information disparity between judges and jurors is the reality that ju-
rors do not have a sense of the normal range of sentences imposed when a defendant is
convicted of a particular offense.1 9 As one attorney explained, jurors "have no concept
about what sentences for [a particular] offense are." 20
Some evidence indicates that providing jurors with more information may alter their
verdicts, especially in cases involving lesser included offenses: "Giving jurors multiple
options is an indirect way of giving them information about sentences; by telling jurors
that they have more than one option to find a defendant guilty, the jurors can conclude that
the likely sentence under one verdict is lower than the sentence under another verdict."'21
Jurors use this information not only to make a decision about guilt, but also as a way of
deciding what sentence to impose. Rather than considering these decisions independent of
one another, they become linked in most jurors' minds. As a result, if the guilt and sen-
tencing phases of a defendant's jury trial are held together, in a unified proceeding (rather
than two proceedings, where the guilt and sentencing phases are bifurcated), significant
danger exists that juries will misuse evidence in determining guilt or innocence that should
be used only in sentencing.1 22
In the context of punitive compensation, these concerns remain relevant. As with
other types of criminal punishments, punitive compensation determinations will be more
accurate if jurors are given more information. Jurors typically do not have information
about the range of possible compensatory sentences a defendant should pay to "make
whole" a community ravaged by addiction and overdoses as a result of her distributing
oxycodone and methadone there.1 23 Likewise, most jurors do not have a realistic sense of
the quantity of harm attributable to an individual viewer of a widely circulated image of
child pornography.
In both the punitive compensation context and the felony sentencing context more
broadly, a relatively straightforward solution exists: give jurors more information. Alt-
hough calculating the quantity of punitive compensation intended to reimburse a concrete
economic loss is a relatively straightforward inquiry, calculating more abstract losses, such
as psychological and emotional losses, or the amount of intangible harm to a community
from one drug dealer's sales, is much more challenging. Juries need information about
how to calculate losses that are less clear. They need information about whether the com-
pensation claimed is comparable to other similar claims, or based in realistic value assess-
ments. Jurors also may need to be able to consider the innocence/guilt decision separate
from the decision about the appropriate amount of compensation to require if the defendant
is convicted.
The best solution to these problems is equality of information: "the jury needs both
119. Id. at 900, 911; Weninger, supra note 109, at 29.
120. King & Noble, supra note 51, at 915-16.
121. Lillquist, supra note 51, at 670.
122. Id. at 623-24.
123. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 87, 89, 101, United States v. Leman, No. 7:10-CR-00010
(GFVT) (E.D. Ky. 2012) (ordering $1 million in community restitution for the "hurt," "pain," and "devestat[ion]"
to the community as a result of defendant's distribution of oxycodone and methadone).
2015] 121
TULSA LAW REVIEW
the same information that judges receive and the power to impose the full range of sen-
tencing options authorized by the legislature." 24 Bifurcating the proceedings and never
allowing the jury to know in advance that it will decide punishment is another possible
solution.1 25 Both of these proposals will be discussed in more detail later in this Article.
For now, the existence of concrete reliable methods that can help juries address this infor-
mation disparity should prevent us from concluding that because juries can be harsher and
more disparate in their felony sentencing decisions, inviting them to determine punitive
compensation amounts is a dangerous idea.
In the end, regardless of the discrepancy in the sentencing result, the underlying
message remains that jurors and judges approach determinations of moral blameworthi-
ness in a similar way. The conclusions they reach, based on differences in knowledge and
perception about the implications of a particular sentence, may differ, but both entities
largely agree on whether a defendant has committed a crime and the wrongfulness of the
defendant's behavior in committing that crime. Providing jurors with equivalent infor-
mation may make the sentencing results substantially similar as well, especially in the
context of punitive compensation.
2. Judges and Juries Reach Similar Conclusions in Punitive Damages Cases
A recent headline in the New York Times read, "Jury Awards $23.6 Billion in Florida
Smoking Case." 26 The family of a chain smoker who died of lung cancer at the age of 36
sued R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, resulting in the jury finding the company liable for
$17 million in compensatory damages, and $23.6 billion in punitive damages. 127 Similarly,
in 2002, a Los Angeles jury awarded $28 billion in punitive damages against Philip Morris
USA.1 28
Stories like these have led many to conclude that jurors are arbitrary, erratic, unpre-
dictable, and unreliable in evaluating punitive damages cases and, by extension, in any
case involving a monetary award. Rarely does one hear of a judge imposing such a stag-
gering punitive damages award. Yet, on closer analysis, the empirical evidence is more
nuanced. Punitive damages are only imposed in a very small percentage of civil cases,1 29
and the instances of a seemingly extreme result, such as the ones mentioned in the previous
paragraph, are almost anomalous.
When they do award punitive damages, judges and juries do not differ significantly
in their rates of awarding punitive damages.1 30 In fact, "the bulk of punitive damages
124. King & Noble, supra note 51, at 888.
125. Lillquist, supra note 51, at 671.
126. Frances Robles, Jury Awards $23.6 Billion in Florida Smoking Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2014, at Al7,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/business/jury-awards-23-6-billion-in-florida-smoking-
case.html?..r=0.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. For example, civil complaints do not often result in trials, and of those cases that do end up with a trial
verdict, less than one percent result in the awarding of punitive damages. Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise,
Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 325, 330 (2011).
130. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the
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awards have been reasonably sober, modest in size, and relatively stable over time."'31 In
trial cases where the plaintiff prevails, judges award punitive damages approximately 4.8%
of the time, and juries award them approximately 3.4% of the time.1 32 In the unusual oc-
currence when a jury awards punitive damages, the awards are generally not in jaw-drop-
ping amounts. More than half of punitive damages cases involve awards of less than
$100,000; 86.6% involve awards of less than $1 million.' 33 In other words, juries who
impose significant punitive damages are the relatively rare exception.
Another factor in the perception that juries award outrageous punitive damages is
the difference in the type of cases judges and juries hear.134 Juries hear most tort disputes,
whereas judges hear most contract disputes.' 35 Punitive damages are generally not availa-
ble in contract disputes, meaning juries decide most punitive damage awards.' 36 However,
despite this finding, several studies show judges awarded a "surprisingly high fraction"-
31.3%, according to one study-of the total number of punitive damages awards given.'37
In fact, more than juries, judges tend to award punitive damages in cases with higher fi-
nancial stakes, whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation.' 38
Thus, despite the popular perception, the literature suggests juries as a whole are no
more likely to make arbitrary, erratic, unpredictable, and unreliable financial awards than
judges. In fact, judges, too, have run the gamut in their approaches to calculating "restitu-
tion," awarding punitive compensation in widely varying amounts from case to case, even
with similar facts and identical losses alleged. 139 Although some of the punitive compen-
sation awards require a straightforward calculation of losses, other calculations are less
clear-cut. For example, in a case where a defendant is convicted of distributing oxycodone
to a community ravaged by drug addiction and poverty, determining the appropriate
amount of compensation to give to the victim community involves a significant amount of
discretion and personal judgment. Likewise, in the context of a defendant convicted of
possessing child pornography, determining the amount of losses attributable to a person
who has downloaded and viewed images featuring a particular victim is far from simple.
Civil Justice Survey of Civil Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 268 (2006); The-
odore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 746
(2002).
131. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 325-26. See also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,497
(2008).
132. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 330. See also Eisenberg et al., supra note 130, at 750 (finding
judges awarded punitive damages in 5.3% of trials won by plaintiffs, whereas juries awarded them in only 3.5%
of cases). In fact, "plaintiffs only sought punitive damages in approximately 10 percent of the trials they won."
Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 332.
133. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 334.
134. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1162-63 (1992).
135. Id. at 332-34. Eisenberg et al., supra note 130, at 749-50.
136. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 332-33.
137. Eisenberg et al., supra note 130, at 752. See also Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the Wall: An
Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1094 (2000) (finding that judges
awarded punitive damages more frequently than juries).
138. Eisenberg et al., supra note 130, at 762-63.
139. See Cortney E. Lollar, Child Pornography and the Restitution Revolution, 103 . CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 343, 365 (2013); Tim McGlone, Victim of Child Porn Wants Viewers to Pay, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Oct. 25, 2009, at A6.
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Nothing from the punitive damages context suggests that jurors would be any poorer at
conducting this analysis than judges, a finding that would seem to bode well for allowing
jurors to determine the punitive compensation awards in criminal cases.
That said, the public perception that jurors make arbitrary and massive monetary
awards in punitive damages cases did not arise out of nowhere. Although sizable punitive
damage awards likely make headlines in large part because they are such an anomaly, the
headlines alone do not explain the public perception. When large punitive damages awards
are imposed, juries tend to be the fact-finder determining them, usually in high-stakes tort
trials.1 40 These occasional, strikingly high punitive damages awards have led courts to
continually engage in the task of determining whether those damages are constitutionally
excessive. Courts conduct this analysis by comparing the punitive award to the amount of
compensatory damages awarded.141 In recent years, the ratio of punitive to compensatory
awards has been greater when a jury issued the award than when a judge issued it.142 Ad-
ditionally, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is more disparate in jury trials
than in judge trials. 143
Some scholars attribute the discrepancy to litigants' strategic decisions about
whether to pursue bench or jury trials.'" Litigants tend to try cases with more money at
stake before juries instead of judges, thereby raising the possibility that juries do not actu-
ally award greater punitive damages than judges do.145 Rather, juries may simply decide
the bulk of cases with large money awards at stake.1 46 Other factors suggest a selection
bias when it comes to parties electing to proceed before a particular fact-finder. 147
Regardless of the cause, the surprising effect of having a jury decide a case in which
a plaintiff is pursuing punitive damages is a 1.4% decrease in the likelihood that the plain-
tiff will receive a punitive damages award.1 48 As a whole, in only .49% of casesl 49 will a
jury return an award that empiricists would consider disproportionate, such as the ones
that tend to appear in the headlines. Thus the research on punitive damages does not bear
out the common perception that juries will not be as fair or careful in determining the
monetary award to impose in a given case, such as in a punitive compensation case.
The import of this social science research for punitive compensation is both obvious
and significant. The punitive damages scholarship strengthens the conclusion that juries
are able to be as fair and considered in their evaluation of difficult and emotionally-charged
criminal and civil sanctions as judges. Whether one endorses the view that the Constitution
140. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 334; see also Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages:
How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-10, tbl. 1 (2004).
141. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) ("few awards exceeding
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory ... will satisfy due process"); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
142. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 328.
143. Eisenberg et al., supra note 130, at 756.
144. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 345-46, 353.
145. Id. at 345.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 345-46.
148. Id. at 330.
149. This figure comes from the 3.4% of cases in which juries award punitive damages and fewer than 14%
of cases where punitive damages awards are greater than $1 million. See Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at
330, 334.
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requires juries to take on the punitive compensation decision, the undisputable conclusion
is that juries certainly are as competent to make this determination as judges. Juries may
have a more diffuse range of awards, resulting in the occasional outlier, but statistically,
they are less likely than judges to award punitive damages in a given case. Extrapolating
this general trend to the punitive compensation context suggests that in situations where
jurors are deciding high stakes, emotionally charged cases involving the potential award
of significant amounts of money, jurors are as likely to award fair, considered compensa-
tion as judges.
IV. LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT JURY DECISION-MAKING
When looking at the criminal sentencing literature and the punitive damages litera-
ture combined, the conclusion is unmistakable: jurors can be as impartial and thoughtful
as judges. But jurors have the critical advantage of being drawn from, and better repre-
sentative of, the community at large, making them the preferable arbiter of any punitive
judgment, particularly one involving compensation.
Although a straightforward evaluation of the similarities in the results judges and
juries reach is compelling, research reveals some areas of weakness in the jury decision-
making process. The literature shows that jurors are prone to "anchoring," a phenomenon
that leads people to make numerical decisions subconsciously relying on other, often en-
tirely irrelevant and unrelated numbers. Studies on affective forecasting show that jurors,
more than judges, struggle with accurately predicting a person's future emotional response
to a traumatic event, and studies on jury instructions expose the difficulty they have deci-
phering many of the jury instructions courts ask them to apply.
Anchoring is a psychological term referring to our natural tendency to use numeric
reference points to influence numeric judgments, even when the reference points are "ar-
bitrary, ludicrous, or irrelevant." 5 0 Jurors, as well as judges, are prone to this particular
weakness in mental processing.
Social scientists have looked closely at "affective forecasting"-the act of predicting
a person's future emotional response to a traumatic event-and found that jurors are par-
ticularly poor at predicting the degree and duration of emotional distress a crime victim
will experience in the future. More often than not, jurors anticipate that victims will con-
tinue to experience the intensity of the suffering they currently experience for a much
longer time than they do, which affects the amount of compensation jurors are willing to
provide. These insights are particularly relevant to the punitive compensation context as
jurors are being asked to decide how to compensate a victim's future emotional losses. If
jurors are not accurately predicting the emotional effect of a crime on a victim, they will
have difficulty imposing a punitive compensation award that is fair and consistent with the
evidence presented.
How jurors ultimately decide on an issue is also heavily dependent on the instruc-
tions judges give them, and the comprehensibility of those instructions. Some of the issues
with which jurors struggle occur because jurors are not reading closely enough. However,
150. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al., Arbitrary Adjudication: How Anchoring and Scaling Distort Awards and
Sentences, at 6 (Preliminary Draft, 2013, on file with author).
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a significant number of misunderstandings come from a lack of clear instructions-about
legal terminology, how a particular instruction relates (or does not relate) to another, and
what standard of proof to apply. Juror error in interpreting instructions has particular bear-
ing on jurors trying to figure out complex financial and monetary determinations, whether
or not they have expert testimony to assist them. Because jurors rely on jury instructions
to figure out how to calculate and establish the amount of punitive compensation, their
difficulty in understanding instructions could be quite problematic here.
This Section focuses on the three primary issues with juror decision-making likely
to arise in determinations of punitive compensation.
A. Juries Are Susceptible to Anchoring
Juries are susceptible to a phenomenon called anchoring. As indicated, anchoring
refers to our use of numeric reference points to influence numeric judgments, even when
those reference points are so irrelevant as to be absurd. Numerous studies show how easily
most people rely on these "mental shortcuts," which can be useful, but which also can lead
to significant errors. 15 People are most prone to errors when they rely on "ludicrous" an-
chors, yet fail to recognize how obviously irrelevant and useless the anchoring number is
to the question they are being asked to answer.1 52 According to some experts, "[i]t is not
simple cognitive laziness . . . in which people simply cannot dial down the appropriate
number enough to avoid any influence of the initial [anchoring number]. Rather, in reject-
ing the ludicrous anchor, people call to mind the most extreme example that they can iden-
tify." 5 3 In other words, although they do not rely on the "absurd anchor," when they esti-
mate the number they have been asked to determine, having this absurdly high (or low)
number in mind, they produce higher (or lower) results.1 54
One commonly cited study involves asking subjects to estimate the average weight
of an adult male raccoon and then an adult male giraffe. When asked to estimate the rac-
coon's weight first, subjects estimated the giraffe's weight at a lower number than when
questioned in the reverse order.'55 When asked to estimate the weight of the giraffe first,
subjects similarly estimated the raccoon's weight as greater than when the subjects were
asked about the raccoon's weight first.1 56 Perhaps obviously, nothing about the experiment
indicated that the subjects making the estimates should use the estimate for one animal as
the starting point for estimating the weight of the other animal. The researchers in the study
concluded, in results that are consistently replicated,'57 that anchoring "consists of a tem-
porary distortion in ... how to translate a quantitative sense of some physical property into
151. Id. at 7; see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
152. Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 7.
153. Id. at 8.
154. Id.
155. Shane W. Frederick & Daniel Mochon, A Scale Distortion Theory ofAnchoring, 141 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: GEN. 124, 130 (2011).
156. Id.
157. Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 9 (citing Gregory B. Northeraft & Margaret Neale, Experts, Amateurs,
and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORG. BEHAV.
AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 89 (1987)).
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a qualitative assessment."'5 8 One's sense of the size of a giraffe does not change,just one's
ability to translate this sense into numbers. 159
Social scientists and legal scholars have long believed anchors affect juries, espe-
cially in their determination of financial penalties. As a result, many scholars have studied
the effect of anchoring on juries, particularly in the context of punitive damages awards.
One common anchor subject to regular analysis is a damages cap.1 60 Legislatures imple-
mented damages caps intending to tap down on "runaway juries." They thought damage
caps would lower the exorbitant punitive damage awards frequently cited by the media.
Few anticipated the actual result of instituting such caps: instead of anchoring awards
lower, damage caps appeared to increase damages awards in "low value" cases. 161 Scholars
later speculated that perhaps the cap providedjurors with a sense of scale, a reference point
from which to start considering the appropriate award.1 62 Regardless of how jurors use the
cap or why the caps increase damages awards, the indisputable conclusion is that the caps
remain an anchor on which juries consciously or subconsciously base their awards. The
results are consistent and the anchoring effect is clear.
Social scientists and those involved with the justice system traditionally believed
that anchors influence judges, decision-makers with more experience, much less than ju-
ries.' 63 To the extent that judges might be inclined to consider or be influenced by reference
points, the law presumes judges can and will consciously put aside those tendencies. Psy-
chological and social science literature reveals that, contrary to this assumption, judges are
as susceptible to "anchoring" as the rest of us. The anchoring effect illustrated in the animal
weight study turns out to occur in the context of judges setting damages awards and crim-
inal sentences as well. 1'6
For example, in the context of damage awards, one study asked federal magistrate
judges to determine the appropriate damages award in a hypothetical personal injury law-
suit where liability had been admitted and the only issue was damages. 165 Study organizers
158. Id. at 8.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id. at 21. See also Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New
Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 597, 605-08 (2005-06); Jennifer K. Robbennolt &
Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW &
HUM. BEHAv. 353,361 (1999); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards
in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 991, 1006 (1995). Cf Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don't
Tell Juries About Statutory Damages Caps: The Merits ofNondisclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 481-86 (1999).
161. Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 22.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., id. at 23.
164. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 151, at 125-26; Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive "Anchoring
Effect" and "Blind Spot" Biases in Federal Sentencing: a Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw,
104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 503-10 (2014); Chris Guthrie, et al., The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empir-
ical Examination ofExecutive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1502-06 (2009); Chris Guthrie, et al., Blinking
on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Inside the Bank-
ruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1233-37 (2006); Andrew J. Wistrich, et al., Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1286 (2005);
Chris Guthrie, et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 790-94 (2001); Thomas Mussweiler &
Fritz Strack, Numeric Judgments under Uncertainty: The Role ofKnowledge in Anchoring, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 495, 495 (2000).
165. Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 164, at 784-87.
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asked half the judges to determine an appropriate damage award; the other half were first
asked to rule on a motion to dismiss for failing to satisfy the minimum amount in contro-
versy of $75,000 to allow federal jurisdiction to be proper in federal court. 166 The motion
was patently frivolous, and almost all the judges asked to decide the motion denied it. 167
But the judges who ruled on the motion awarded the plaintiff less money than the judges
who just determined the appropriate damages award.168 The judges who had not ruled on
the motion awarded an average of $1.2 million, whereas the judges who first denied the
motion to dismiss awarded an average of $882,000.169
Anchors can be found throughout our legal rules and statutes. Predictably, damage
caps provide an anchor for judges as well as juries. Presented with a hypothetical case
where the judge had to determine pain and suffering damages as a result of a car accident,
and was told the defendant's injuries "are not serious, and do not warrant a significant
damage award," some judges were given an anchor and others were not.1 70 Scholars de-
signed the study to produce a compensatory award of $30,000-$50,000.171 The materials
asked half the judges to determine the amount of pain and suffering. The other judges were
told that the damages could not exceed a $332,236 cap.1 72 Judges who had not been in-
formed of the cap imposed pain and suffering damages in the average amount of $58,600,
whereas judges who had been told of the cap imposed an average of $87,000 in damages.' 73
Anchors not only affect the financial award a judge may impose, they also distort
the time scale, affecting quantitative judicial judgment as to the appropriate sentence to
impose in a case. One hundred and thirty-five judges were given a one-page description
of a criminal case in which a hypothetical man pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter.1 74
Study organizers also gave the judges a few other facts about the defendant. They asked
judges to decide the appropriate sentence for the man "without regard to the sentence max-
imum in your own jurisdiction."' 75 Half of the judges were instructed to determine the
sentence in years, the other half were asked to do so in months.1 76 Those who authorized
a sentence in years imposed an average sentence of 9.7 years, or 115 months, whereas
those who sentenced in months provide an average sentence of months authorized a sen-
tence of 66.4 months, or 5.5 years.1 77 In other words, judges sentencing in months assigned
much lower sentences than did judges sentencing in years. Nothing in the judges' back-
grounds or political affiliations could explain the disparity in the results.'78 Anchoring was
the only logical conclusion.
166. Id. at 790-91.
167. Id. at 791-92.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 791.
170. Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 24.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 25.
173. Id.
174. Id at 17.
175. Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 17.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 18.
178. Id. at 18-19.
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Anchoring is not always unexpected. Some judicial anchoring is based on anchors
that most in the justice system see as acceptable and even desirable. For example, judicial
sentences tend to be influenced by the recommendations of probation officers.'79 In the
federal system, judges are expected to use the presentence reports probation officers pre-
pare as an initial jumping off point for calculating a defendant's sentencing guideline range
and ultimate sentence.18 0 Judges also tend to rely on previous decisions and recommenda-
tions made by police officers, prosecutors, and other judges who have examined the case
during earlier proceedings.' 8 1 Sentencing recommendation forms influence judicial deci-
sion-making as well.1 82 In other words, judges rely on people and forms tasked with mak-
ing a preliminary determination of the appropriate sentence to anchor the sentences they
impose. Most scholars and judges would view some of these anchors as desirable; others
might appear somewhat more problematic. Unmistakably, the criminal justice system ex-
pects and almost requires judges to use some of these anchors in calculating the appropri-
ate sentence to impose on a defendant.
Although we accept and even encourage a judge's use of these anchors, those an-
chors can be erroneous. Probation officers, police officers, prosecutors, and even other
judges can make mistakes. Information may be inaccurate, calculations may be incorrect,
and recommendations may reflect a bias. Yet judges often rely on these anchors whether
the data supporting the anchor is reliable or accurate.'8 3 Studies show that judges are no
more adept at recognizing or taking into account the weaknesses of using these mistaken
or erroneous numbers as anchors than they are the wildly arbitrary and "ludicrous" anchors
mentioned in previous examples.1 84
In the context of punitive compensation, both judges and juries likely remain subject
to subconscious and arbitrary psychological influences that need to be addressed. Both
fact-finders search for reference points from which to translate their sense of wrongdoing
into a concrete and tangible number that accurately reflects the blame. Given that both
judges and jurors anchor, two possible solutions emerge, each of which likely precludes
the other.
One possible solution, given our criminal justice system's acceptance of some an-
chors as "legitimate," would be for courts to provide whoever is making the punitive com-
pensation determination with anchors that are accurate and reliable, and also, ensure the
fact-finder remains as sheltered as possible from any irrelevant anchors. The consequence
of allowing unreliable anchors to affect a punitive compensation decision is apparent in
light of what scholars have learned about how judges make sentencing decisions.
Another potential solution is to find some method of reducing any fact-finder's reli-
ance on these anchors. Mistakes and errors happen, and in many ways, may be inevitable.
179. Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, The Process of Sentencing Adult Felons: A Casual Analysis
Judicial Decision, in THE TRIAL PROCESS 413,434 (Bruce Dennis Sales ed., 1981).
180. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 164, at 523-29.
181. Mandeep K. Dhami, Psychological Models ofProfessional Decision Making, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 175, 177
(2003).
182. Shawn Bushway et al., Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion: Quasi-Experimental Evidence
from Human Calculation Errors, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 291 (2012).
183. See, e.g., id. at 291. Cf Dhami, supra note 181, at 177.
184. Bushway et al., supra note 182, at 314-15; see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 12.
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Asking a fact-finder to make a determination about punitive compensation from their in-
tuition, without any anchoring numbers, might get us to a more fair and equitable result
than relying on even the most carefully placed anchors. Part V will address each of these
possible approaches in more depth.
B. Jurors' Cognitive Biases In Affective Forecasting
Although judges and juries are both prone to anchoring, juries are somewhat more
prone toward inaccurate forecasting of a victim's emotional response to a traumatic situa-
tion. Across the board, jurors tend to over-predict the degree of emotional distress a victim
will suffer in response to a traumatic event, such as being a crime victim, experiencing a
debilitating accident, or suffering the loss of a loved one.' 85 Inaccurate emotional forecast-
ing can lead to inflated damage awards and overcompensation of victims.' 86
As a whole, people tend to accurately predict whether they will experience positive
or negative emotions in response to a particular event and what specific emotions they will
experience. 87 But accuracy of prediction goes down when they are asked to anticipate
their response to a complex event, and when trying to predict events that are far in the
future.188 Many people have the most trouble accurately anticipating the intensity and du-
ration of their emotions.1 89
Psychological biases arise particularly in the context of pain and suffering and he-
donic damages, both of which are relevant to determinations of punitive compensation.
Under the prevailing federal criminal "restitution" statute, courts must order criminal de-
fendants to compensate victims for the "full amount" of their losses, including "the cost
of necessary . .. professional services ... relating to physical, psychiatric, and psycholog-
ical care." 90 Because juries notoriously have a difficult time accurately predicting future
emotional states, applying this statute in practice is likely to significantly impact a jury's
ability to assess the appropriate compensation for future psychiatric and psychological
losses.' 9 '
Empirical studies show that a person's emotional responses to difficult, even trau-
matic events often last for less time than most of us might expect. In other words, people
return to their "emotional baselines sooner rather than later." 92 Scholars call this process
"hedonic adaptation." Not only do people adapt more quickly to painful events than we
185. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155,
166, 183 (2005).
186. Id. at 183.
187. Id. at 188.
188. Id. at 167.
189. Id.
190. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(2)(A) (West 2012). See also HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY (1966).
191. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 185, at 182.
192. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Trouble with Vronsky: Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective
States, in THE WISDOM IN FEELING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 114, 116-17
(Lies Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002); Blumenthal, supra note 185, at 168-69. See also Camille B.
Wortman & Roxanne Cohen Silver, The Myths of Coping with Loss, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
349, 352 (1989).
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might imagine, but many of us also fail to anticipate that our emotional states will return
to normal in the relatively rapid time that they do.' 93 We consistently fail to realize that
the intensity and duration of a difficult emotional experience will be less than our intuition
or belief tells us.1 94
Social scientists have studied this phenomenon in the context of civil damages
awards "designed to compensate the victim of a tortious injury for the harm experienced,
with the goal of placing her in a position equivalent to that before the tort occurred."'9 5
The compensatory damages decision mirrors the decision about punitive compensation
that juries would make in a criminal case, as the previously quoted federal statute indicates.
Damage awards are likewise aimed at compensating a victim's losses and returning her to
the financial position she was in prior to the crime.1 96
In the context of damages awards, juries pervasively and consistently engage in in-
accurate emotional forecasting, resulting in their over-prediction of the degree of emo-
tional distress a victim will experience. Jurors rely on the amount and duration of a victim's
current suffering to predict that person's future suffering. They presume the victim will
continue to experience the level of emotional harm she is now experiencing for a much
longer period than most victims do experience.1 97 As a result of these forecasting errors,
jurors regularly impose excessive damages awards.1 98 Jurors likely would do the same
when determining a punitive compensation award, as the inquiry they would be undertak-
ing is much the same.1 99
Expert testimony may appear to be the panacea for this problem of emotional fore-
casting.200 Typically, attorneys for victims seeking punitive compensation hire experts to
calculate the amount of future therapy and mental health treatment the victim will need.
Undoubtedly, experts are better equipped than juries to anticipate how much psychiatric
and psychological treatment a victim may need in the future. However, as many commen-
tators have discussed at length, experts regularly battle it out during fact-fmding hearings,
presenting differing calculations and analyses. With emotional trauma and loss, the aver-
age person may feel more able to discern the accuracy and credibility of an expert wit-
ness's testimony than they might in, say, a complex mortgage fraud case. But the result
still may be an over-reliance on the juror's own ability to anticipate how much emotional
distress a victim will experience. 201
The experts who testify in these cases usually are not affective forecasting experts.202
Rather, they are psychologists who are testifying on behalf of either one of the parties in
193. Blumenthal, supra note 185, at 169-72; Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. Sl57, S161-
62, S 164-66 (2008); Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REv. 745 (2007).
194. Blumenthal, supra note 185, at 172; KAHNEMAN, supra note 151, at 405-07.
195. Blumenthal, supra note 185, at 182.
196. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DAMAGES §§ 901 cmt. A, 903 (1979)).
197. Id. at 183-84.
198. Id.
199. Cf Sunstein, supra note 193, at S168-69, S173-74.
200. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 185, at 187-88.
201. See, e.g., id. at 183.
202. Id. at 187.
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the criminal case or the victim herself. The testimony usually centers on the expert's pre-
diction of the need for future therapy, mental health treatment, and other future psycho-
logical and psychiatric treatment. Thus, the experts from whom juries hear generally are
not well-versed in the literature of affective forecasting.
Rather, the experts from whom juries normally hear simply offer competing versions
of how much treatment a victim will need in the future, usually based on how that victim
seems to be responding to treatment at the time of the expert's testimony. Sometimes ex-
perts hired by victims even appear to engage in the same flawed emotional forecasting as
the average juror.203 Often, defense experts do not have access to the victim in order to
make an independent determination of the accuracy of the prosecution's expert evaluation.
This can lead jurors to credit the expert who has actually examined the victim, but who is
relying on the same flawed methodology as the jurors in predicting the future emotional
harm.
Several studies have shown that jurors also are not particularly adept at evaluating
expert evidence.204 In the event more than one expert testifies, jurors often have trouble
discerning whose testimony is more reliable. 205 Rather than highlighting the difference
between "high-quality" and "low-quality" experts, competing expert testimony seems to
cause jurors to become skeptical of both.206 Jurors appear to judge experts based on how
much they are paid and whether they use "concrete examples" or summaries of their find-
ings. 207 In part, jurors' inability to evaluate the credibility and reliability of expert testi-
mony might stem from their own lack of familiarity regarding the area over which the
expert claims expertise.208 As a result, expert testimony does not necessarily resolve the
dilemma of how to get jurors to accurately evaluate future emotional losses.
Were jurors tasked with deciding the appropriate amount of punitive compensation
to impose in a given case, this emotional forecasting problem would need to be addressed.
Part V discusses some of the possible ways to go about limiting the impact of this phe-
nomenon.
203. For example, one expert testifying on behalf of a child pornography victim anticipated that the victim,
now in her early twenties, would need therapy until the age of eighty-one. United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017,
2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fl. Sept. 2, 2009); United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (W.D. Pa.
2010). However, most mental health experts acknowledge that if mental health treatment has not been effective
in the first ten years-and that is a generous amount of time-another fifty years of therapy is not going to change
that. See Lollar, supra note 139, at 358 n.39.
204. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Jury Ignorance and Political Ignorance, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1167, 1181
(2013); Bradley D. McAuliff et al., Can Jurors Recognize Missing Control Groups, Confounds, and Experi-
menter Bias in Psychological Science?, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 247 (2009); Bradley D. McAuliff& Margaret
Bull Kovera, Juror Need for Cognition and Sensitivity to Methodological Flaws in Expert Evidence, 38 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 385 (2008); Lora M. Levet & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing
Expert Witnesses for Educating Jurors About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 363 (2008).
205. Levett & Kovera, supra note 204, at 370-71.
206. Somin, supra note 204, at 1181.
207. Id at 1182.
208. Id.; Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 192 (Robert E. Litan ed. 1993); cf Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1552-53 (1998).
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C. Jury Instructions Challenges
Not only are jurors deficient at predicting the degree and duration of a crime victim's
future emotional responses, they often have trouble wading through the opaque language
of jury instructions. Substantial evidence from both the civil and criminal contexts sug-
gests that juries regularly fail to understand jury instructions.209 Although jurors pay close
attention to the law, often even reading jury instructions aloud in the jury room, 210 they
still regularly misunderstand the instructions they are given.211 Because the task of deter-
mining a victim's losses-past and future, tangible and intangible-is difficult in any cir-
cumstance, the lack of clear guidance and information about how to undertake the process
of determining the appropriate amount of punitive compensation can be particularly prob-
lematic. In fact, empirical evidence shows the determination of damages awards is the sole
area in which confusing jury instructions affect the outcome.
States have long recognized the need to increase legal accuracy in jury instruc-
tions. 212 One attempt to simplify the law for jurors came in the form of pattern jury instruc-
tions. 213 However, even the introduction of pattern instructions was not a cure-all in ad-
dressing the issue ofjuror comprehension. Pattern instructions generally do a good job of
assisting lawyers and judges during trial, but they often do little to increase a juror's un-
derstanding of the law.214 The comprehensibility of pattern instructions for non-lawyers
remains a significant issue. 215 The American Bar Association recognized as much in 2005,
remarking that "jury instructions remain syntactically convoluted, overly formal and ab-
stract, and full of legalese."1 216 A few states have consulted with communications experts
in developing pattern instructions, eliminating some of the substantial issues in those ju-
risdictions, but most states have not addressed the issue.217 As a result, laypersons regularly
fail to comprehend the relevant, and sometimes critical, legal concepts.218
209. William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview ofEarly Findings, 70 IND.
L.J. 1043, 1093-94 (1995); Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the
Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1207 (1995); Shari Seidman Diamond,
The "Kettleful of Law" in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 Nw. U. L. REV.
1537 (2012); Somin, supra note 204, at 1182.
210. Diamond, supra note 209, at 1553.
211. Id. at 1555-85.
212. Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 153, 155 (1982).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 209, at 1544; Severance & Loftus, supra note 212, at 156.
215. Severance & Loftus, supra note 212, at 156.
216. AM. BAR. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, princ. 14A cmt. subdiv. A, at 108 (2005),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011-buildamerican-jury/final-commen-
tary-july-j 205.authcheckdam.pdf
217. Diamond, supra note 209, at 1545 n.34 (confirming California consulted a linguist in drafting its instruc-
tions); Severance & Loftus, supra note 212, at 156 n.5 (noting that in the 1970s, Arizona, Florida and Pennsyl-
vania "made some efforts toward making pattern jury instructions understandable for laypersons"). See also Peter
Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1081 (2001).
218. Diamond, supra note 209, at 1542. See also Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation:
Effects on Death Sentencing, Comprehension and Discrimination, 33 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 481, 486-87 (2009);
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias
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A recent study of fifty civil jury deliberations provides some insight into the source
and pervasiveness of juror confusion. The study revealed that 19.3% of juror comments
referencing instructions they received were inaccurate. 219 Eighty-three percent of the er-
rors were due to miscomprehension, and those errors occurred in forty-eight of the fifty
cases.220 The longer the written instruction and the more difficult the instruction was to
understand, the greater likelihood of juror error. 221 A judge or another juror often tries to
correct mistakes in jury instruction comprehension, but they only manage to catch 47% of
the mistakes. 222
Although jurors' unfamiliarity with legal language or simple misreadings led to
some errors, poorly structured and worded jury instructions led to others. 223 In fact, the
dense language of jury instructions accounted for most of the jury errors that arose. 224
Instructions requiring a straightforward reading of words with plain meanings confused
jurors as often as technical legal language.225 Nineteen percent of the references to burdens
of proof were incorrect. 226 Trying to piece together how difference instructions relate to
one another also confused jurors.227 Sometimes this confusion resulted in jurors thinking
there were connections that were not present, and other times, jurors missed connections
that were present. 228
Studies of criminal juries found similar patterns. Although having jury instructions
is more helpful than having none, instructions fail to increase overall comprehension.229
In one study, investigators concluded that before deliberating on a defendant's guilt or
innocence, the average juror only understood half of the instructions presented to them by
the judge.23 0
The degree of juror confusion over instructions is striking, especially given that
judges and juries reach similar results in most cases. Despite evidence that instructions
confuse jurors, in a study out of Arizona, these errors only affected damages awards in
seven of the fifty cases, and they did not affect the verdict in any of them.231 Thus, to the
degree that jurors are misunderstanding the instructions, the misunderstanding generally
does not affect the outcome, except in the context of monetary awards.
and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 337, 347 (2000); Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Under-
stand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND& WATER L. REV.
59, 88 (1988); Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth Thomburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communi-
cate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 78 (1988); Richard L. Weiner, et al., Comprehensibility ofApproved Jury Instructions
in Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 455, 462 (1995).
219. Diamond, supra note 209, at 1556.
220. Id. at 1557-58.
221. Id. at 1556.
222. Id. at 1558.
223. Id. at 1557-58.
224. Diamond, supra note 209, at 1559.
225. Id. at 1559-60.
226. Id. at 1562.
227. Id. at 1564.
228. Id.
229. Severance & Loftus, supra note 212, at 157.
230. Id. at 160 (citing Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, I
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977)).
231. Diamond, supra note 209, at 1539, 1546, 1593.
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The consistency of jurors reaching a similar decision to judges does not suggest that
we should ignore the issue of jury instruction comprehension. Jurors clearly struggle to
understand the instructions with some regularity, and reach a similar conclusion to judges
in spite of, not because of, the instructions.232
V. WHAT WOULD ALLOW JURIES To MAKE BETTER DECISIONS
Remedies exist to help make jury decision-making stronger, more reliable, and more
accurate. Jurors engage in subconscious and inaccurate predictions about the harm a victim
will continue to experience in the future. They silence some voices in the deliberation
process. They sometimes fail to understand the instructions they are given. Part V proposes
remedies to ameliorate the issues raised in Parts III and IV, offering solutions that will
ensure jurors are as fair and impartial in their punitive compensation decision-making as
possible, and certainly as reliable as judges in reaching a result.
A. Effective Jury Composition
When functioning properly, a jury represents the voice of the community. Yet, as
we know from Part 1II, juries often do not resemble the communities around them.233 Even
when disadvantaged groups are present in the jury pool and on the jury, they often are
hesitant to express their views. Ensuring diverse jury pools and encouraging jurors to give
voice to their views is particularly important in any criminal sentencing decision, including
a punitive compensation decision.
We need jury pools that constitute a fair cross-section of the community, in all senses
of that term. As indicated previously, 234 we know that race and socio-economic status con-
tinue to play significant roles in criminal sentencing and undoubtedly would play a role in
determining the appropriate amount of punitive compensation as well. Undoubtedly, gen-
der, disability status, and other salient discernible factors influence an individual juror's
approach to compensation, too.
In criminal proceedings, the differences in racial, gender, and economic back-
grounds seem most likely to become manifest. Specific to the punitive compensation de-
termination, the undertaking requires a decision about the proper amount of money to both
compensate a victim and punish a defendant. For jurors of all backgrounds, these determi-
nations may invoke a wide, and divergent, range of responses and considerations. For ex-
ample, the amount needed to compensate a victim and the amount needed to punish a
defendant may differ significantly from one another. Similarly, ordering an indigent de-
fendant to pay a significant amount of punitive compensation may be unrealistic. Many
other factors may play in to an individual juror's judgments about compensation. For this
reason, having jurors of various racial, gender, ethnic, disability status, and socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds is essential to a determination of how much compensation satisfies the
twin aims of punitive compensation.
Evidence indicates several ways to minimize or even eliminate the disparities in the
232. Id. at 1596.
233. See supra Part Ill(B).
234. See supra Part Ill(B)(1).
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jury pool. Most jurisdictions draw their jury pools from voter registration records. Voter
registration rolls simply do not mirror the composition of the community at-large. Whites
in this country register to vote at significantly greater rates than Hispanics, and somewhat
greater rates than African-Americans. 235 Pulling jury panels from utility company data-
bases instead of, or in addition to, voter registration rolls would be one step toward chang-
ing the composition of the pool. Most everyone has to pay utilities, regardless of race or
socio-economic background, so utility information would reach a broader swath of the
population than voter registration rolls. Others have suggested supplementing the source
of potential jurors with records of those receiving disability or social security benefits. 236
These records also would likely lead to the inclusion of many individuals who are not
currently present in jury pools.
Eliminating, or narrowing the scope of, felon disenfranchisement laws would have
a significant effect on jury composition as well. Approximately half of those who are pro-
hibited from serving on a jury due to felon disenfranchisement laws have already com-
pleted their sentence and court-ordered obligations. 237 Public opinion surveys overwhelm-
ingly support returning voting rights, and the complementary jury service rights, to
individuals who have completed their criminal sentence.238 A slightly smaller, but still
significant number-nearly two-thirds of those surveyed-support returning that right to
those who are on probation or parole as well. 239 This support has led to several changes in
the law over the past fifteen years. Approximately half of U.S. states amended their felon
disenfranchisement laws to expand voting rights to those previously prohibited from both
voting and serving on a jury. 240 The trend in this direction should continue.
Jury size is another essential factor in ensuring the diversity of juries. Larger juries
are more likely than smaller juries to contain members of minority groups, more accurately
recall testimony, and give more time to deliberation. 241 Twelve person juries also yield
more reliable, less variable punitive damages awards than six person juries.242 Conversely,
reducing the size of a jury tends to increase the variance in the jury's decisions.243 As a
result, social scientists conclude with virtual unanimity that larger juries are preferable to
smaller ones for determinations of liability, guilt, and damages.244 Requiring twelve people
to decide punitive compensation awards would help ensure that determination is sound
235. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE-VOTING RATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC
ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT ELECTIONS) 2 (2013), available at http://www.cen-
sus.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf.
236. Martha Neil, Judge Dismisses Entire 112-Member Jury Pool Over Lack of Racial Diversity, ABA
JOURNAL, May 13, 2015, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/judge-dis-
misses jury-pool-dueto_1ack of diversity.
237. The Sentencing Project, supra note 83, at 1.
238. Id. at 4.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S.
CALIF. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 14 (1997).
242. Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
849, 884 (1998).
243. Saks, supra note 241, at 14.
244. Vidmar, supra note 242, at 897.
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and fair.
Finally, courts must address the concern about indirectly censoring the voices of
jurors from underrepresented groups. As indicated in Part III, jurors who are minorities or
from a lower socio-economic class are regularly reluctant to speak up during jury deliber-
ations, and, when they wait until late in the process, other jurors regularly disregard their
voices. 245 This indirect silencing of minority voices can undermine the positive gains in
how the jury pool is selected.
If courts required jurors to record their thoughts and beliefs anonymously prior to
deliberations and then share those perspectives with one another at the beginning of delib-
erations, the opportunity for all voices to be heard would increase tremendously. 246 The
group as a whole can then consider everyone's viewpoints early in the deliberation process
without any view being linked to any particular individual, and therefore, without any
subconscious biases creeping in. As prominent psychologist Daniel Kahneman noted,
"[t]his procedure makes good use of the value of the diversity of knowledge and opinion
in the group. The standard practice of open discussion gives too much weight to the opin-
ions of those who speak early and assertively, causing others to line up behind them."247
Although courts are reluctant to get involved in jury deliberations, even this small change
would increase the accuracy of the deliberation process and should be worth considering.
Notable scholars have suggested variations on this approach. For example, Cass
Sunstein proposes encouraging "leaders" to "refrain from expressing any opinion at all
until other people have said what they think," to "indicate sympathy for a wide range of
views, encouraging diverse opinions to arise," and to "suggest in particular that they wel-
come information and perspectives that diverge from their own." 24 8 As Sunstein observed,
"if norms favor disclosure of privately held information, then self-silencing will be re-
duced significantly." 249 With punitive compensation, those leaders could be whoever is
selected as the jury foreperson, perhaps.
Providing jurors with timely instructions urging them to follow this approach, and
explaining to them the motivations behind it, will likely get jurors to comply. For example,
a judge could instruct jurors to be aware of this troubling social dynamic in jury delibera-
tions and encourage them to counteract it.250 Evidence suggests that when jurors are in-
formed of this dynamic, they are much more conscientious about listening to their peers
during their deliberations. 251 "WJlurors respond to specific information they can understand
and appreciate." 252 In other words, juries will follow instructions when a judge gives the
jury a reason to follow them. 253 The timing of these instructions is also important. When
245. See supra Part 1ll(B)(1).
246. KAHNEMAN, supra note 151, at 84-85; Prescott & Starr, supra note 92, at 351-52; Sunstein, supra note
92, at 1018.
247. KAHNEMAN, supra note 151, at 84.
248. See Sunstein, supra note 92, at 1020.
249. Id. at 1014.
250. Id. at 1019-20.
251. Id.; see also David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REv. 407,
416-17, 432-33 (2013) (discussing effects of debiasing on juries).
252. Sklansky, supra note 251, at 438.
253. Id. at 439.
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judges give instructions at the end of trial, juries are much more likely to follow them. 254
Because of the importance of the deliberative process to determinations of punitive
compensation, ensuring the jury pool is representative of a truly fair cross-section of the
community and ensuring all voices are heard during deliberation is of the utmost im-
portance. Although the Court has not addressed the role of economic background in the
context of the fair cross-section cases, and has rejected a constitutional requirement that
juries have twelve members, these factors are crucial to a fair and unbiased jury, whether
that jury is determining a verdict or the appropriate amount of compensation to impose. In
the context of any decision involving the jury's judgment as to punitive compensation,
encouraging consideration of the range of viewpoints shared by the community is critical.
B. The Importance of Unity
For at least a century, bifurcation of the trial and sentencing portions of a criminal
proceeding has been the norm.25 5 In the felony context, juries typically decide a defend-
ant's guilt or innocence, and the trial judge decides the sentence of those found guilty. In
the capital context, juries decide both verdict and sentence, but in separate and purportedly
independent proceedings. As a result, most scholars and judges have developed an incli-
nation toward bifurcation, believing that such a system allows fact-finders the ability to
consider issues of liability and punishment separately.256
Using a bifurcated trial to determine another facet of punishment, namely the re-
quired amount of punitive compensation, is therefore not a particularly bold or innovative
idea. Yet both the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical evidence to support bifur-
cation are mixed. A review of both the criminal and civil literature leads to the conclusion
that a unitary presentation of the facts is likely a better approach for punitive compensa-
tion.
As indicated, historically, courts bifurcated capital trials from capital sentencing
hearings. Courts embraced bifurcation as a way of keeping juries from contemplating, and
confusing, the evidence of a defendant's guilt with evidence related to the punishment
decision-whether she should live or die. Despite the accepted belief that bifurcation min-
imizes "cognitive overload," 257 studies from the capital sentencing context indicate that
the guilt phase of the trial tends to predispose juries toward a penalty preference before
even hearing evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial. 258 One study found that seventy
percent ofjurors were "absolutely convinced" of their punishment decision before hearing
any evidence as to the appropriate sentence. 259 In that same study, almost half of jurors
acknowledged that conversations about the possible penalty arose during the jury's guilt
254. Id.
255. Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation as Only a Trial Right, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1268-
69(2014).
256. See, e.g., Prescott & Starr, supra note 92, at 304, 353-54.
257. Id. at 353.
258. Sandys, supra note 209, at 1194.
259. Id. Of those who decided the penalty before hearing any evidence, forty-three percent believed the de-
fendant should receive a death, rather than a life, sentence. Id. at 1192.
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deliberations.260 As a result, whether bifurcation eliminates any of the concerns of a unitary
trial seems highly questionable.
Other criminal courts have only begun to consider bifurcation in recent years. Bifur-
cation first came to prominence in the non-capital criminal context when the Supreme
Court annpunced its 2000 decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.261 Apprendi held any fact
that increases the maximum penalty of a crime must be submitted to the jury for determi-
nation.262 The decision blurred the line courts had drawn between facts that were "ele-
ments" of a crime, which had to be submitted to a jury, and "sentencing factors," which
were submitted to a judge.263 As a result of Apprendi's mandate, numerous courts had to
make a practical determination about the best way to present the constitutionally required
facts to a jury, especially "sentencing facts" that most judges considered to be within their
sole purview.
Subsequent to Apprendi, courts, particularly federal courts, began to figure out how
that rule would work in practice. For example, if a defendant pled guilty to possessing an
unquantified amount of methamphetamine, but the prosecution sought a sentence presum-
ing the possession of 75 grams, would a jury need to be sworn to determine the exact
amount of methamphetamine the defendant possessed? If the defendant had gone to trial
instead of pleading guilty, would a separate jury need to be sworn to answer that question?
Would the trial and sentencing need to be bifurcated?
Courts landed on bifurcation as the most workable approach. Hanging on to an in-
creasingly diminishing distinction between facts required to prove the existence of a crime
and facts solely relevant to sentencing, most courts concluded that bifurcated jury trials
and/or a separate sentencing hearing in front of a jury following a guilty plea was the best,
if not the only, answer.264 Relying on the capital context, at least one circuit noted, "[t]here
is no novelty in a separate jury trial with regard to sentence, just as there is no novelty in
a bifurcated jury trial, in which the jury first determines liability and then, if and only if it
finds liability, determines damages." 265 As a result, most courts began to accept the idea
of juries determining constitutionally important facts that a judge will then use to deter-
mine the appropriate sentence.
Recently, courts have begun to grapple with whether to bifurcate financial penalty
decisions from the guilt phase of a trial in the context of criminal fines. In 2012, the Su-
preme Court held in Southern Union v. United StateS266 that any fact exposing a criminal
260. Id.at1191.
261. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
262. Id. at 490.
263. Id. at 478-88, 494-96.
264. See, e.g., Figueroa v. United States, 463 F. App'x 99, 100 (3d Cir. 2012) (sentencing jury empaneled to
determine quantity of drugs defendant conspired to possess); United States v. Montiel-Sanchez, 171 F. App'x
599, 600 (9th Cir. 2006) (using bifurcated jury for "sentencing" phase of trial); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d
508, 514 (7th Cir. 2004) (authorizing jury determination of drug quantity at bifurcated trial); United States v.
Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2002) (approving bifurcated jury trial to determine identity and quantity of
the drugs possessed); United States v. Cooney, 26 F. App'x 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (remanding case for jury to
determine amount of drugs involved).
265. Booker, 375 F.3d at 514.
266. 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
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defendant to a higher potential maximum sentence, including a higher criminal fine, must
be submitted to a jury pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey.267 United States v. AU Optron-
ics Corporation,268 an antitrust case where the corporate defendant was charged with price-
fixing over the course of a decade, was one of the first cases after Southern Union to ad-
dress the practicalities of this decision-making process. 269 For the first time, the govern-
ment had to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt either the amount of gain the cor-
porate defendant unlawfully acquired or the amount of loss the victim(s) experienced. The
government requested a bifurcated trial, which the court denied, "[seeing] little benefit." 270
Some experts believe most courts will continue to deny such requests because, unlike in a
capital case, they would require "duplicative presentations of evidence" and take up more
of the court's time.271
The punitive compensation decision is more akin to determinations about criminal
fines, and thus, somewhat different than other criminal decisions. Unlike capital cases,
where entirely different evidence is presented to a jury at the penalty phase than at the trial
phase, here, much of the evidence between the trial and penalty phases would likely over-
lap. Especially in light of the capital sentencing studies showing that evidence of guilt
bleeds into the decision about punishment, it is hard to discern a benefit in the punitive
compensation context to keeping the proceedings separate. In presenting the evidence of
guilt, prosecutors can easily present evidence of the amount of loss.
Evidence from the civil damages context confirms this conclusion. As indicated pre-
viously, because punitive compensation has come to resemble the awarding of civil puni-
tive damages, evidence from the civil context is uniquely relevant to the punitive compen-
sation context. Early studies of bifurcated civil proceedings suggest defendants were more
likely to prevail on the question of liability, whereas in unitary trials, plaintiffs were more
likely to win.272 However, liability results did not resemble the damages decision. Com-
pensatory damages awards were significantly larger in bifurcated trials than in unitary tri-
als, largely because jurors weighed all the evidence before them in reaching the liability
decision when they were tasked with deciding both liability and damages. 273 If the dam-
ages context is any indication of what might occur in the punitive compensation context,
bifurcating trials and punitive compensation hearings would lead to lower conviction rates
and higher compensation amounts.
In the context of punitive compensation, unitary trials seem to make the most prac-
tical and empirical sense. The evidence is largely overlapping, and the fact-finder's deci-
sion usually relies on information provided during trial. The primary concern with a uni-
tary approach is that jurors would not have access to information about a defendant's or
267. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
268. No. 09-CR-110, 2012 WL 2120452 (N.D. Cal. June 11,2012) (lllston, J.).
269. Deirdre A. McEvoy & Melissa R. Ginsberg, The Use of Expert Witnesses for Penalty Determinations in
Criminal Antitrust Cases: A Study of United States v. AU Optronics, 28 ANTITRUST ABA 95, 95 (2014).
270. Id. at 98.
271. Id.
272. Vidmar, supra note 242, at 872-73.
273. Id.
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victim's financial resources in determining the appropriate amount of punitive compensa-
tion to impose. Although the law currently prohibits courts from considering the resources
of either when determining the amount of criminal "restitution" to impose, this remedy
would be more effective if the fact-finder were permitted to consider a defendant's finan-
cial resources when determining the appropriate amount of punitive compensation to im-
pose, an issue discussed at length in the next Section.274
C. Telling Juries Possible Sentencing Outcomes
In contrast with judges, juries are exposed to only a single case at a time-the one
case they are deciding. Judges have the benefit of regular exposure to similar (and differ-
ent) cases, giving them a baseline from which to make a decision in any given case. Many
states employ a solution for ensuring the jury's lack of knowledge is not a concern: they
provide judges with the ability to review jury decisions. However, this solution undermines
jurors' sense of responsibility for the decision they are making and leads them to be less
careful in reaching a decision, if they deliberate at all.275
Other, more empowering strategies might allow jurors to come in with more robust
background information, giving them close to equivalent information as judges when they
make decisions. By providing the jury with the full range of information, the jury is in the
best position to determine whether a defendant's moral culpability is proportional to the
punishment being sought.276 This, in turn, would help to eliminate disparities in the puni-
tive compensation awards juries return.
Historically, courts have been reluctant to provide jurors with sentencing infor-
mation. Their reasoning is fairly circular. Courts adopted a strict dichotomy between trial
and sentencing, and justified preventing jurors from hearing sentencing information by
asserting that jurors did not need to know about punishment because jurors do not play a
role in sentencing. According to this view, informing jurors of potential punishments in-
troduces extraneous information into fact-finding decisions at trial.277
274. See, e.g., Lollar, supra note 139, at 397-99.
275. This occurs regularly in the capital sentencing context. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury
Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1095, 1097 (1995); William J.
Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law's Failure to Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sen-
tencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 74-75 (2003); Ross Kleinstuber, "Only A Recommendation ": How Delaware
Capital Sentencing Law Subverts Meaningful Deliberations and Jurors'Feelings ofResponsibility, 19 WIDENER
L. REV. 321, 331-32 (2013); Michael A. Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitution-
ality of Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REv. 283
(1989); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70
IND. L.J. 1103, 1130 (1995). The problem is particularly acute in jurisdictions that allow judges to override a
jury's sentencing decision in a capital case. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misper-
ception ofSentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1138 (1995).
276. Chris Kemmitt, Function Over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury's Historical Role as Sentencing Body,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 132 (2006). Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski recently made a
similar recommendation: "Jurors should be told the gravity of the decision they are making so they can take it
into account in deciding whether to convict or acquit. As representatives of the community where the defendant
committed his crime, the jury should be allowed to make the judgment of whether the punishment is too severe
to permit a conviction." See Kozinski, infra note 332, at xxi.
277. Lance Cassak & Milton Heumann, Old Wine in New Bottles: A Reconsideration of Informing Jurors
About Punishment in Determinate- and Mandatory-Sentencing Cases, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411, 416-
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Precedent no longer supports this distinction in a juror's role. Since Apprendi and
Southern Union, jurors have played a constitutionally-mandated role in determining a de-
fendant's sentence. Even if Supreme Court precedent did not reject the strict line between
the jury's role at trial and its role at sentencing, a belief in the soundness of our jury system
requires this result. As Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski recently noted:
[We should g]ive jurors a say in sentencing.... [W]e studiously ignore
the views of the very people who heard the evidence and are given the
responsibility to determine guilt or innocence while reflecting the values
of the community in which the offense occurred. . . . Jurors should be
instructed on the range of punishments authorized by law and, if they
find the defendant guilty, entrusted to weigh in on the appropriate sen-
tence.278
Providing jurors with information previously kept off limits is critical. Jurors need
to be aware of the moral consequences of their decisions, particularly decisions intended
to convey, at least in part, a message of moral condemnation. 279 After all, "[i]n a demo-
cratic society, jurors' views of appropriate criminal sentences should track those of the
legislators who enact the sentencing statutes." 280 As one scholar explained, "[j]ury trials
force the people-in the form of community representatives-to look at crime not as a
general matter, the way they do as voters, but instead to focus on the particular individual
being charged." 281 If we expect jurors to be the voice of our community, they need to be
given the tools to be able to do that job to the best of their ability.
The need for jurors to have additional knowledge and guidance is especially acute
in the punitive compensation area. The Supreme Court recently ruled where "it is impos-
sible to trace a particular amount" of a victim's losses to a defendant "by recourse to a
more traditional causal inquiry," a court "should order restitution in an amount that com-
ports with the defendant's relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim's
general losses." 282 The sentencing fact-finder "must assess as best it can from available
evidence the significance of the individual defendant's conduct in light of the broader
causal process that produced the victim's losses" using "discretion and sound judg-
ment." 283 A precise mathematical inquiry is "neither necessary nor appropriate." 284 In other
words, because fact-finders are no longer engaged in ascertaining actual concrete unlawful
gains, as restitution historically required, nor even actual concrete losses, as criminal "res-
titution" of thirty years ago began to necessitate, very few guideposts remain to assist any
fact-finder in making the punitive compensation determination.
278. Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0,44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxi (2015).
279. Cassak & Heumann, supra note 277, at 427.
280. Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries ofthe Consequences
of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2223, 2233 (2010).
281. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era ofMandatory
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 62 (2003).
282. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1727 (2014).
283. Id. at 1728-29.
284. Id. at 1728.
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Several proposals appear to provide viable methods of addressing this issue. Provid-
ing juries with the full range of sentencing options authorized by the legislature (and Sen-
tencing Commission, to the extent sentencing guidelines are applicable in a given jurisdic-
tion) and making sure jurors understand what those sentencing options entail would give
juries a baseline from which to begin their deliberative process. Additionally, judges could
provide juries with a slightly modified version of the reports pretrial services or probation
agencies prepare for judges in anticipation of sentencing. Usually, juries are not privy to
this information when asked to sentence a criminal defendant. Although issues of confi-
dentiality may prevent disclosure of some information in a presentence report, the report
may contain enough useful information that allowing jurors to access even part of it can
be helpful. 285 Of course, courts would need to set clear parameters on the use of the infor-
mation. Judges would need to instruct juries on how to use a presentence report - what
information to rely on, what information contained therein may or may not be relevant,
and how to use sentencing guidelines.
Another possibility is to have some type of punitive compensation guideline, similar
in theory to the sentencing guidelines that give a framework for determining the applicable
amount of incarceration and fine to impose in a given case. A punitive compensation
guideline could provide a floor and ceiling on punitive compensation awards based on
particular factors or experts or issues.286 A framework that provides jurors a consistent
method for translating the harm and moral message into a dollar amount would help ensure
uniformity and predictability in the jury's decisions.287 Such guidelines could "place heavy
reliance on existing knowledge about hedonic harms" and consider "the extent that the
short-term hedonic losses are present even when long-term adaptation occurs. . . ."288 Like-
wise, they could "attempt to make sensible translations into monetary equivalents." 289
Courts could keep a database and generate statistics that would inform jurors of the aver-
age amount of punitive compensation for individuals convicted of a similar offense who
caused a similar type and degree of harm to a victim. 290 This system would give jurors an
idea of the "heartland" range of punitive compensation amounts in a particular type of
case.
The potential downside of such a guideline system is that it raises anchoring con-
cerns.291 However, guidelines could provide juries with the "right" kind of anchors for
making their determination rather than allowing them access to anchors that would be less
reliable. This proposal will be discussed in more detail in the next Section.
Because ofjurors' increased role in making sentencing determinations, courts should
285. Presuming, of course, that the redacted portions do not end up slanting the evidence available to the juries
one way or the other.
286. Cass Sunstein and others have put forth a similar proposal in the context of punitive damages awards. See
Sunstein, supra note 193, at S 185-86; Cass Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1153, 1183 (2002).
287. lontcheva, supra note 47, at 358.
288. Sunstein, supra note 193, at S 184.
289. Id.atS185.
290. See, e.g., lontcheva, supra note 47, at 369.
291. See discussion supra Part IV(A).
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provide jurors making punitive compensation decisions with as close to equivalent infor-
mation as judges so that the disparity between the two is not so great. "The jury needs both
the same information that judges receive and the power to impose the full range of sen-
tencing options authorized by the legislature" whenever the jury is making a sentencing
determination rather than the judge. 292 If we fail to provide them this information, we can
only expect juries to produce arbitrary sentences, including arbitrary punitive compensa-
tion awards. 293
D. Unmooring Juries from Their Anchors
Both judges and juries are susceptible to anchoring.294 Although studies have sug-
gested that anchors may affect judges less than juries, 295 ample evidence reveals that both
fact-finders are subject to this subtle bias.296 In the context of punitive compensation de-
terminations, this anchoring bias has the potential to significantly skew the calculations
and conclusions a fact-finder reaches. There are several ways to minimize anchors' effects
on junes.
Social science indicates that accountability can reduce anchoring. 297 In one particu-
lar study, the authors asked participants to explain their decision-making process in reach-
ing a particular judgment. 298 Knowing they had to articulate how they reached their judg-
ment led participants to be less swayed by the normal effects of anchoring. 299 As we know,
judges often have to explain their decision-making processes, which may be one reason
judges are slightly less subject to the anchoring effect. Asking juries to similarly explain
how they arrived at a particular punitive compensation amount should have the same ef-
fect. 300
Although courts are incredibly reluctant to look into the "black box" of jury deci-
sion-making, significant benefits inure from requiring juries to articulate the reasons for
imposing a particular amount of punitive compensation. If the jury has to give reasons for
its moral assessments in a public way, its members must think more carefully and critically
about their assessments, because they know those moral assessments will be subject to
critical examination, and possibly repudiation.301 In making the jury's reasoning public,
each juror must accept responsibility for the moral judgments and conclusions she is reach-
ing. If each juror engages in this thoughtfulness, the likelihood of a jury imposing an arbi-
trary punitive compensation award will decrease. Each juror need not articulate her own
292. King & Noble, supra note 51, at 888.
293. lontcheva, supra note 47, at 359.
294. See supra Part IV(A).
295. Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 22-23.
296. See supra Part IV(A).
297. Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution Effect, 57 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388 (1989).
298. Id. at 388.
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 151; Mark Spottswood, The Hidden Structure ofFact-Finding, 64 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 131, 147 (2013).
301. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions ofEmotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 269, 363-64 (1996).
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specific thought process, although she should be encouraged to do so in her own mind.
Rather, after the jury deliberates and reaches a consensus, courts should require the jury
as a whole to make a statement declaring the jury's collective reasoning and determination.
Several scholars have proposed another possible approach: prohibit the parties from
mentioning numbers that might operate as anchors. 302 This proposal would be quite diffi-
cult to implement in the context of punitive compensation since the very act of determining
the appropriate monetary award is rooted in particular losses claimed by a crime victim.
To ask jurors to determine losses with no numbers provided would be a Herculean task.
Other scholars propose instructing participants to look for and focus their attention
on arguments against using a particular anchor.303 In the context of negotiations, for ex-
ample, forcing the conscious mind to engage in the task of thinking the opposite, of push-
ing against the anchor, has been shown to reduce and even eliminate the effect of anchor-
ing.304 If jurors are presented with a particular set of numbers on which they will rely in
calculating a punitive compensation award, perhaps instructing them about the effects of
anchoring and encouraging them to consciously try to counteract the anchoring effect
might help to eliminate the phenomenon.
As suggested previously, 30 5 a better approach for diminishing the effects of anchor-
ing is to create a composite akin to the sentencing guidelines, but for punitive compensa-
tion awards. 306 Rather than dissuading jurors from relying on anchors, providing them with
relevant and useful numbers would allow jurors to anchor their punitive compensation
decision within the context of similar decisions made by other fact-finders.
In a study of judges attempting to determine the appropriate amount of damages to
award in a hypothetical case without anchors, many expressed frustration at the lack of
reliable numerical anchors on which to draw.307 Jurors inevitably would feel the same way,
and rightfully so. As Cass Sunstein observed, "juries and judges are likely to have diffi-
culty in generating monetary figures to reflect pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of
life." 30 "Because it is difficult to scale without a modulus, and because anchors will have
302. Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 37; Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don't Tell Juries About Statutory
Damages Caps: The Merits ofNondisclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 468, 481-86 (1999). Iowa District Court Judge
Mark Bennett has proposed a similar approach for federal judges in criminal cases, urging them to consider the
sentencing factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 before turning to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See
Bennett, supra note 164, at 530-33.
303. KAHNEMAN, supra note 151, at 126-27 (citing Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as
Anchors: The Role of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 82 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 657
(2001)).
304. Id. This approach is more problematic here, as it presumes that the people trying to reach a consensus are
advocating or negotiating for a particular position at the beginning of the negotiation. Ideally, jurors are not
coming into deliberations with pre-set conclusions about their position. Presuming jurors do approach delibera-
tions about punitive compensation with an open mind, they would likely have an incredibly challenging time
attempting to ascertain what monetary award would compensate the full amount of a victim's losses. By trying
to do the opposite of whatever a party or victim is advocating, jurors will not necessarily reach a fairer or more
appropriate conclusion. Rather, they will only be trying to play "devil's advocate" against the only anchors they
have.
305. See discussion supra Part V(C).
306. Rachlinski et al., supra note 150, at 37; Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 164, at
823.
307. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 164, at 823.
308. Sunstein, supra note 193, at S 184.
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a significant effect," without some kind of anchor, "unjustified inequality and excessive
and insufficient awards are inevitable." 309 Providing juries with relevant and useful an-
chors allows them to rely on information in a manner equivalent to how judges use sen-
tencing guidelines, mandatory maximum and minimum sentences, and criminal fines to
determine a sentence now.
Creating a punitive compensation guideline akin to the United States Sentencing
Guideline system could assist juries in using helpful, and hopefully fair, anchors to calcu-
late the appropriate amount of punitive compensation to impose. Likewise, requiring juries
to explain why they reached a particular punitive compensation decision would similarly
reduce or eliminate the effects of anchoring. A composite, explanatory approach appears
easier to implement and more fitting for the punitive compensation context than removing
anchors altogether or encouraging juries to push against the anchors provided.
E. Increasing Accuracy in Affective Forecasting
Although both judges and jurors are prone to anchoring, affective forecasting im-
pacts jurors more often than judges. As previously discussed, jurors tend to exaggerate the
degree and duration of a victim's emotional reaction to a criminal event. Judges experience
a greatly diminished degree of affective forecasting due to having been exposed to many
more criminal cases and victims.
One common proposal is to ask juries to behave like judges. Common wisdom ex-
pects judges to try and "set aside" their emotional response-a concept termed "behavioral
suppression"-in an attempt to more accurately predict a victim's long-term response. 310
The presumption is if the judge can respond in an emotionally "neutral" manner, she will
be more accurate in her affective forecasting,31' and, consequently, determine a monetary
award that adequately compensates the victim's losses. Assuming this approach is effec-
tive, encouraging juries to do the same might be a simple and relatively straightforward
counter to the problem of affective forecasting.
Unfortunately, however, studies show behavioral suppression to be counter-produc-
tive. By attempting to suppress her natural emotional response and prediction, a person
ends up "draw[ing] heavily" against her cognitive capacity, "leaving fewer resources avail-
able for problem-solving." 312 As a result, one is "temporarily 'stupider,"' opening herself
up instead to the "pitfalls" of an "unrealistic and inflexible approach." 313 Rather than elim-
inating the emotional pitfalls, behavioral suppression may "magnify" the emotion in-
stead.314
As with anchoring, reasoned reflection can minimize affective forecasting errors.315
By "reconstructing aspects of a situation, shifting attention, reappraising reactions to a
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485, 1543-
45(2011).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1538.
313. Id. at 1539, 1545.
314. Id. at 1547.
315. Maroney, supra note 310, at 1550.
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situation,"3 1 6 jurors can more effectively regulate and manage their intuitive emotional
responses to a victim's long-term emotional and hedonic harm, and they can approach the
punitive compensation task with reasoned consideration.
In order to encourage the jury to reasoned reflection, ideally, a party would present
an expert on emotional forecasting to the jury, allowing them to learn about the phenom-
enon and counter their own implicit and unknown impulses. Expert witnesses may have
the ability to temper the effects of emotional forecasting by helping jurors better under-
stand how to approach the task of determining a fitting punitive compensation award.
As we already know, juries rarely hear from experts on emotional forecasting in
large part because judges rarely allow them to testify.3 17 Given that many punitive com-
pensation decisions are likely to turn on expert evaluations of a victim's psychological,
emotional, and economic state, these criticisms might be cause for concern. Judicial train-
ing on this issue might encourage judges to permit emotional forecasting experts to testify
when one of the parties proffers such an expert.
Judicial training on affective forecasting could have other benefits as well, as judges
actually are no better at evaluating complex empirical and statistical evidence than ju-
ries.318 Numerous studies have analyzed judges' ability to evaluate expert and scientific
evidence. Many judges do not feel prepared to deal with the range of scientific and expert
issues that arise regularly in their courtrooms. 319 Nor are their assessments of the evidence
necessarily accurate. 320
Evidence suggests that jurors could benefit from hearing the testimony of an affec-
tive forecasting expert. Jurors struggle with two primary categories of expert testimony:
empirical and statistical evidence. 32 1 Social science studies have concluded that "when
[expert testimony] is presented in a form that they can use," jurors are able to "make rea-
sonable use of complex material." 322 Additionally, short, targeted training sessions can
help individuals-both jurors and judges-improve their understanding of statistical and
methodological reasoning.323 Providing juries with some type of instruction prior to trial
could help alleviate this issue. The obvious difficulty would be in determining how to fit
such training into the trial process.
Akin to a training, courts also might consider a jury instruction that informs juries
about the literature on emotional forecasting and encourages them to regulate or manage
their emotional responses by thinking logically and rationally about the harms alleged.
Evidence shows jurors can be educated to make their subconscious thought processes con-
scious and to confront and think through their possible biases. 324
316. Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. ScI. 161, 171
(2012) (citing Maroney, supra note 310).
317. See supra Part IV(B); Blumenthal, supra note 185, at 187.
318. Robbennolt, supra note 100, at 488-92.
319. Id. at 488-89.
320. Id. at 489-90.
321. Id. at 487-88 n.101.
322. Id. at 487-88.
323. Robbennolt, supra note 100, at 505-06.
324. Bandes & Blumenthal, supra note 316, at 171.
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If judges inform jurors of the tendency to over-predict the long-term harm and pain
a person will experience, they may be able to thoughtfully curb some of the tendencies
when determining the appropriate punitive compensation award.325 The result will be a
punitive compensation decision that more accurately reflects the losses caused by a de-
fendant in addition to being more reflective of the jury's determination of moral blame-
worthiness. Reminding jurors to review the evidence and discuss it with fellow jurors may
also help reduce affective forecasting to some degree and result in a more thoughtful and
considered compensatory award.
F. The Need for Comprehensible Jury Instructions
Finally, jury instructions play a critical role in ensuring that juries have the tools they
need to determine the most appropriate punitive compensation award. As indicated in Part
IV, criminal jurors often are confused by the way courts word and present jury instruc-
tions.326 Likewise, in the context of non-economic civil damages, how judges present an
instruction can make a significant difference in how juries award damages. 327 The instruc-
tions are critical as "they give juries a common starting place, a shared set of issues, fac-
tors, or guidelines on which to initiate deliberations." 328 Ensuring that juries have reliable
and understandable instructions to guide them in making a determination about punitive
compensation remains vital.
Numerous studies illustrate jurors' lack of comprehension of pattern jury instruc-
tions,329 especially in the context of determining damages. Evidence from juror observa-
tions suggests two primary reasons indecipherable instructions do not affect the outcome
in a more significant way. First, jurors talk to one another and often help each other un-
derstand the instructions. 330 Throughout the deliberation process, jurors consistently cor-
rect one another when they assert an inaccurate view of the law.
Jury instructions themselves are the other indisputable aid. The presence of a printed
out copy of the jury instructions in the deliberation room has a tremendous impact on a
jury's comprehension of the instructions. 331 Jurors repeatedly refer back to the instructions
as they try to work through the issues in the case. Although some courts permit jurors to
take a copy of the instructions back to the deliberation room with them, many courts pro-
hibit it. Written jury instructions are a critical resource.332
325. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1277 (2012).
326. See, e.g., Severance & Loftus, supra note 212, at 153.
327. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman & Alexander S. Radus, Instructing Juries on Noneconomic Contract Dam-
ages, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221 (2012).
328. Brown, supra note 96, at 1319.
329. Severance & Loftus, supra note 212, at 157-60, 162-96. Analyzing Kentucky's jury instructions for read-
ability, Professor Marla Sandys found that most of the jury instructions relevant to death sentencing require more
than a college education to understand. See Marla Sandys, Assoc. Prof., Dep't of Crim. Just., Indiana Univ.,
Remarks at The Second Annual Forum on Criminal Law Reform in the Commonwealth of Kentucky: What
Kentucky Capital Jurors Misunderstand (Nov. 15, 2013) (on file with the author). Similarly, Sandys found that
ease of reading was revealingly low, usually ranging between 30 and 40, but going as low as 15 on a scale of 1-
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330. Id. at 1558, 1594-95.
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Notably for the context of punitive compensation, these two resources do not always
improve damages award determinations. Although it is a relatively small percentage, four-
teen percent of civil juries studied misapplied the jury instructions when determining the
amount of damages to award.333 This finding is significant for the punitive compensation
context, as the process of determining damages is not so different from the process of
determining punitive compensation. The degree of misunderstanding also highlights the
importance of making jury instructions, particularly those related to making a financial
determination comprehensible.
Many studies show that revising instructions according to psycholinguistic princi-
ples can significantly increase juror comprehension. When linguistic experts write instruc-
tions in a manner that takes into account empirical information regarding what factors
affect memory, perception, and comprehension of language, jurors understand more. 334
Basic changes, such as using active instead of passive voice, rearranging the order of words
so that the instruction reads more logically, and replacing legalese with more commonly
used words, can make a tremendous difference.335 This better understanding means not
only that jurors have an enhanced command of crucial legal concepts, they also have an
enhanced ability to accurately apply those concepts to the facts in a case. 336 Jurors' confi-
dence levels reflect this increased understanding as well. 337
Everyday language and careful wording on jury instructions increases juror compre-
hension. Likewise, providing the jurors a written copy of the instructions assists in the
accuracy of their decision-making. If courts employ both of these methods of making in-
structions more accessible, jurors will be better able to focus the bulk of their energy and
time on reaching the most accurate result rather than wasting both the court's and their
own time and resources trying to discern what the instructions mean and how to interpret
them.338
In the context of punitive compensation, accurate and understandable jury instruc-
tions remain as important, if not more so, than in other areas of criminal trials. Ascertaining
what constitutes the "full amount" of a victim's losses under the federal restitution statute
requires directed instructions, as courts across the country have struggled with what this
term means.339 Courts have consistently held that criminal "restitution" should be meas-
ured by the victim's losses rather than the defendant's gains; juries will need clear instruc-
tions on how to go about determining that amount.340 Likewise, in complicated fraud cases,
courts spend extensive energy determining on what date the loss should be calculated and
according to what standard. In numerous situations, juries will need to be informed in
333. Sandys, supra note 329, at 1593 (a general misunderstanding ofjury instructions affected jury damages
awards in seven out of fifty cases).
334. Severance & Loftus, supra note 212, at 159.
335. Id. at 159-60. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psy-
cholinguistic Study ofJury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979).
336. Severance & Loftus, supra note 212, at 194.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 209, at 1596 (discussing how, in both the Rod Blagojevich trial and the
fifty civil trials observed, jurors spent substantial time just trying to figure out the jury instructions).
339. See, e.g., Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).
340. See discussion supra Part 11.
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explicit detail how to apply the rules in existence in a given jurisdiction.
Further insight as to the substantive information helpful to juries comes from the
punitive damages context. Drafters of damage jury instructions have had a particularly
difficult time providing useful guidance on how to determine the amount to be awarded.34 1
Damages instructions "usually tell the jury nothing more than to place the plaintiff in the
position it would have occupied if the breach had not occurred. What that means in oper-
ation is left to the jury." 342 As a result, it is unclear that juries receive enough information,
or the "right" information, to make a considered and fair assessment of the appropriate
amount of damages to impose in a given case. 34 3
A series of Supreme Court cases in the early 1990s began to change what juries were
told in considering punitive damages.344 Prior to that, almost all state and federal courts
adopted the common law approach of allowing juries to "inflict" damages on a defendant
"in view [of] the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the
plaintiff."345 In an attempt to limit the effects of "unlimited jury discretion" that "may
invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities," the Supreme Court en-
couraged the drafting of jury instructions that require the jury to engage in reasonable
decision-making with "adequate guidance" from the court.346 The Court approved instruc-
tions that gave the jury information about the punitive and deterrent goals of punitive dam-
ages, informed the jury of the need to take into consideration the "character and the degree
of the wrong as shown by the evidence," and explained that the imposition of punitive
damages was not required.347 As with other juror decision-making, when provided with
the reasons for the legal rules one had to apply, the results were more reliable and accu-
rate.348 As a result, according to the Court, these decisions provided the jury constitution-
ally sufficient guidance in "rational decisionmaking" and "meaningful individualized as-
sessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution." 349
If courts provided juries with information about the goals of imposing punitive com-
pensation in their instructions, this information undoubtedly would greatly assist jurors in
understanding the instruction.350 Allowing jurors to understand the purpose(s) courts and
legislators intend for punitive compensation to serve is likely to increase the odds that
jurors will reach a constitutional and fair result. Additionally, to the extent that judges
341. Cf Sunstein, supra note 193.
342. ROBERT E. KEHOE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTRACT CASES 1023 (1995).
343. Hoffman & Radus, supra note 327, at 1235.
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(1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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349. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.
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accept and utilize a basic formula to ascertain the full amount of a victim's losses, giving
juries instructions to guide them through the process of employing that formula can help
them make a defendable punitive compensation determination. 351 In conjunction with in-
formation regarding the aim of imposing punitive compensation, these instructions could
make a significant difference for jurors.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article endorses the designation "punitive compensation" because it de-
scribes the remedy already being employed on a daily basis in courts across the country.
Recognizing this reality, this Article proposes that we grapple with the full consequences
of what it means to be imposing punitive compensation as part of a criminal sentence.
Because punitive compensation is operating as a punishment, courts should treat it as a
punishment and grant it the full range of constitutional protections provided for other crim-
inal punishments. This means not only that punitive compensation should be protected by
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, but from a practical perspective, jurors should be the
entity we, as a community, desire to have as fact-finders in determining punitive compen-
sation. Jurors, as the conscience of the community, should decide the degree of moral
blameworthiness of a defendant's actions and what amount of compensation is sufficient
to "make a victim whole."
351. Hoffman & Radus, supra note 327, at 1251.
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